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The Effects of Symbolic and Realistic Threats on Moral Exclusion From the Scope of Justice

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THE EFFECTS OF SYMBOLIC AND REALISTIC THREATS
ON MORAL EXCLUSION FROM THE SCOPE OF JUSTICE

THE EFFECTS OF SYMBOLIC AND REALISTIC THREATS
ON MORAL EXCLUSION FROM THE SCOPE OF JUSTICE

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology

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ABSTRACT

Moral exclusion refers to a psychological process that removes others from our moral community—those whom we treat with fairness and concern for their welfare. The present research is concerned with how perceived symbolic threats (threats to the ingroup's values, morals, and worldview) and realistic threats (threats to the ingroup's well-being and resources) are related to moral exclusion. Perceived symbolic and realistic threats from an outgroup (Mexican immigrants) were measured (Study 1) and manipulated (Study 2) to discover their predictive and causal relationships with moral exclusion. It was found that both symbolic and realistic threats predicted moral exclusion and did so uniquely after controlling for prejudice, and that symbolic threat was a causal factor in moral exclusion. Implications of the current research for future studies of moral exclusion are discussed, as well as its implications for intergroup relations and reducing moral exclusion of outgroups.

This dissertation is approved for recommendation
to the Graduate Council.

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my late father, George E. Leighton, whose commitment to social and environmental justice became a part of my core beliefs and circulates through my research interests. George was a pilot, sailor, engineer, social activist, and musician, whose occupation was to help factory workers avoid hearing loss through industrial noise control. He urged me to pursue work that would have application for, and make a difference in, the lives of people around the world. His generosity of spirit for everyone he met, along with his unwavering love for his sons, challenges me every day to live with the same depth of love and commitment.

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Introduction

Whenever our ethnic or national prejudices are aroused, in times of scarcity, during challenges to national self-esteem...habits of thought familiar from ages past reach for the controls.... Darkness gathers. The demons begin to stir. (Sagan, 1996, pp. 26–27)

I asked a friend recently what I should write for an introduction to a paper that concerns, in part, the social psychological processes involved in genocide. She suggested to start with “Once upon a time...” “Okay,” I replied, “once upon a time there was no genocide. Then people formed groups.”

That trite response has a ring of truth; intergroup relations are at the heart of genocide. The systematic elimination or mass murder of people based only on their group membership has been a serious problem since European expansion and is suspected in Mesolithic populations over 5,000 years ago (Kiernan, 2007). Old Testament texts instructed “thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth: but thou shalt utterly destroy them—the Hittites, Amorites, Canaanites...” (Deuteronomy 20:16–17 King James Version).

Genocide and war are extreme versions of intergroup conflict, but there are less extreme versions, including ethnopolitical conflict, religious bigotry, political polarization, and anti-immigrant prejudice. In the more extreme versions, violence is direct: people are subject to violence perpetrated on them directly; in the less extreme versions, the violence is indirect, often manifesting as deprivations of economic or psychological welfare. These deprivations, when perpetrated by (and justified through) social structures and institutions, are referred to as “structural violence” (Galtung, 1969; Winter & Leighton, 2001). In the case of intergroup direct and structural violence, a common psychological process is treatment of individuals based on intergroup differentiation and categorization. The importance of intergroup processes in structural violence was eluci-

dated by the European Union's Copenhagen Summit for Social Development, which advocates for recognition and representation of all groups and just redistributions to help prevent social disintegration on the basis of social identity (Wiman, 2009).

Structural violence is often perpetrated by a dominant majority population that holds power over distribution of resources and other social goods, and targeted toward a marginalized minority population that has relatively little power or ability to affect these distributions. The majority population, occupying and controlling the center of power structures in the society, can make laws and create the conditions for the exploitation of the minority. The minority usually has neither the resources nor access to political power needed to make changes in the political or economic system that is managed by the majority. This situation often leads to the minority being excluded from access to resources, denied welfare, and not considered to be entitled to fairness—three conditions collectively known as moral exclusion from the scope of justice (Opatow, 1988, 1990a, 1990b).

Overview

The present research is intended to better understand the antecedents and psychological factors that are involved in the perpetration of moral exclusion of outgroup members. It will discuss the general concepts of the moral community (Deutsch, 1974, 1975), moral exclusion (Deutsch, 1985), and the scope of justice (Opatow, 1988, 1990a, 1990b), and their relationship to intergroup relations. The experimental procedures, measures, and context of the present studies will be described, followed by results and discussion. Finally, a general discussion will discuss the results in combination and discuss implications of the present research for studies of moral exclusion and for intergroup relations in the context of moral exclusion.

Justice and Exclusion

Morton Deutsch was the first psychologist to propose the notion of moral exclusion, and he did so in the context of what bases are used for allocations in distributive justice (i.e., equity, equality, need). He suggested that justice is granted only to those with whom we have at least a minimal degree of cooperation, and that relations with individuals who fall outside the bounds of our “moral community” are not considered part of our justice concerns (Deutsch, 1974, 1975, 1985).

Theories of distributive justice have generally assumed the distribution will occur within groups (Cohen, 1991; Deutsch, 1975; Wenzel, 2001; Wenzel, 2009), whereas moral exclusion theory is concerned more with the justice of allocations to outgroups. More specifically, moral exclusion is the denial of resources, welfare, and fairness from groups who are considered different, abhorrent, or expendable. Such groups are likely to be composed of outgroup members, but some outgroups may originate as members within an ingroup and, because of some arbitrary criteria, are then categorized as deviants or outsiders, excluded from justice, and deprived of the just deserts that are expected for other ingroup members. Whether done at the *intragroup* or *intergroup* level, those to whom we apply differential standards of fairness are placed more or less within our justice boundary. People easily include themselves and ingroup members within their justice boundaries and can easily exclude others. For example, basketball fans might easily derogate the visiting team’s players, while being upset if their own team’s players were derogated by visiting fans.

Those who are perceived to be outside one’s moral community can be excluded from considerations of fair treatment and fair outcomes (Deutsch, 2006) and therefore excluded from one’s scope of justice. This exclusion process is referred to by Deutsch as

a moral exclusion, whereby others are excluded from the moral community through a contraction of the scope of justice:

Justice is not involved in relations with others—such as heathens, “inferior races,” heretics, “perverts”—who are perceived to be outside one's potential moral community or opposed to it. An implication of this line of reasoning is that the narrower one's conception of one's community, the narrower will be the scope of situations in which one's actions will be governed by considerations of justice (Deutsch, 1985, pp. 36–37).

Inclusion and exclusion. Generally speaking, justice is marked by outcomes and treatment that are fair in relation to the other individuals in the scope of justice (Deutsch, 2006). At an interpersonal and intergroup level, this might be manifested in such things as prosocial behavior, inclusion of those from marginalized social or spatial regions, inclusion in procedural justice, and allocation of social resources (Opatow, Gerson, & Woodside, 2005).

Moral exclusion implies that those outside the scope of justice may be denied the standards of fair treatment that apply to those within the scope of justice. Those excluded are outside the boundary of justice. Thus, they may not be seen as entitled to distributive or procedural justice, resources and social goods may be withheld from them, and their well-being may be of little or no concern. In fact, in extreme cases of moral exclusion, active harm or death may be justified and acceptable as in the case of genocide (Staub, 1989).

The Scope of Justice

Some review of the terms used thus far is in order to help clarify the objects, operators, and processes involved in moral exclusion. The moral community is the group of individuals with whom an individual shares some amount of cooperation and to whom distributive justice is applied in the form of fair treatment and outcomes (Deutsch, 1974, 1975, 1985, 2006). The scope of justice is a representation of the psycho-

logical boundary delineating those who are inside and outside of our moral community (Deutsch, 1974, 1985; Opatow, 1988, 1990a, 1990b). Moral exclusion refers to the psychological processes by which individuals or groups are excluded from one's moral community and kept outside the scope of justice (Opatow, 1990b).

A reasonable metaphor for the scope of justice is a child's sandbox. The child may allow many other children to play in the sandbox, while sharing the sand, toys, and camaraderie equally with these children. There may be other children outside the sandbox whom the child excludes from the sandbox. The children inside the box may subtly or forcefully keep those outside the sandbox from sharing the sand, toys, and camaraderie. The children inside the box might one day arbitrarily decide that red-haired children no longer can play in the sandbox. All red-haired children will be pushed outside the sandbox, excluded from reentry, without concern for their welfare or happiness. The red-haired children would now be morally excluded by the children in the sandbox: no longer part of the distributive justice of the moral community, placed outside the scope of justice, and prevented from accessing its resources and opportunities.

In this sandbox example, the criterion for moral exclusion from the scope of justice is red hair, a tangible characteristic of the individual. Sometimes, the criterion for moral exclusion is made by an intangible aspect of an individual's perception of another person; this intangible aspect provides the basis for moral exclusion through social categorization. A horrifying example of this social categorization process leading to moral exclusion comes from the central African country of Rwanda.

Genocide in Rwanda. In 1994, a genocide occurred in Rwanda that resulted in the deaths of at least a half million, and likely about 800,000 individuals (Eltringham,

2004). The basis for the genocide, perpetrated by the majority ruling Hutu population, was the victims' identification as members of the minority Tutsi population. The Hutus and Tutsis are ethnically the same: they share a common language, religious practices, eat the same foods, and live intermingled with each other. Although there were some physiological characteristics that the Hutus used as stereotypes in seeking out Tutsis for extermination, for the most part the identification as Tutsi or Hutu was made on the basis of stated ethnicity on national identification cards, government-issued lists, or having their names and locations read out on state-controlled radio. In pre-genocide Rwanda, the designations of Hutu and Tutsi took on the strength of racial markers of social categorization; thus stigmatized, the Tutsis became enemies of the Hutus.¹

Thus, the Hutus in Rwanda "saw" the mostly intangible Tutsi "race" of their former friends and neighbors, categorized them as enemies, morally excluded them from the scope of justice, and proceeded to murder them. The Hutu's scope of justice, once encompassing their Tutsi neighbors, contracted, thus excluding the Tutsis. This example is one of extreme moral exclusion, as it resulted in genocide, a form of direct violence (Wagner, 2001).

Structural violence. Moral exclusion often takes more subtle, but still damaging, forms that Deutsch refers to as "marginalization," preventing those excluded from "full participation in the political, economic, and social life of their societies" (2006, p. 53). This more subtle form of exclusion would characterize structural violence, and is seen in the United States and other societies as a variety of laws that exclude certain groups from full participation in civil and economic life.

An example of structural violence and the moral exclusion process comes from U. S. history and helps further illustrate the role of social categorization in moral exclu-

sion. In the 1886 *United States v. Kagama* court case, Native Americans were defined as excluded from the equal membership in the moral community of non-Native Americans (Stumpf, 2004). In this case, Native Americans became subject to federal plenary authority, which meant that the federal government had exclusive power over them and their constitutional protections were removed. Three years later the court extended this exclusion to Chinese permanent residents. In both of these cases, the exclusion was made on the basis of category membership, describing the Native Americans as a race that is weak and childlike and Chinese residents as aberrant strangers and separate from the moral community. This example illustrates a form of moral exclusion that has been described as “delegitimization” (Bar-Tal, 1989).

Delegitimization. Delegitimization is a cognitive process whereby differentiation is used via social categorization to assign groups to stigmatized social categories that are associated with extremely negative attributes (measured by social norms and values of the delegitimizing group) and that may even be perceived as less human (Bar-Tal, 1989; Kelman, 2001). It is also an affective process, accompanied by intense emotions indicative of fear, rejection, or contempt.

This constellation of features makes delegitimization dangerous because it also has a behavioral component, whereby harming the delegitized group could be used to avert some perceived threat and to justify the delegitimization (Bar-Tal, 1990). For example, Latin American military officers justified use of torture against radicals and suspected guerillas on the basis that they represented a threat to the state (Heinz, 1995, as cited in Kelman, 2001). In general, once the differentiation is made and outgroup is delegitized, the delegitimizing ingroup members will seek out information that sup-

ports the differentiation. This “freezing” (Bar-Tal, 1989; Bar-Tal & Geva, 1986) of the categorization helps maintain the delegitimized group in a state of moral exclusion.

Dynamics of the scope of justice. The scope of justice is malleable and contracts or expands in response to social categorization processes and contextual factors, including intergroup processes, threat, authoritarianism, ideology, and conflict (e.g., Corneille, Yzerbyt, Rogier, & Buidin, 2001; Deutsch, 2006; Halperin, Pedahzur, & Canetti-Nisim, 2007; Maoz & McCauley, 2008; McLaren, 2003; Miron, Branscombe, & Biernat, 2010; Passini, 2008; Quillian, 1995; Schwartz, 2007; Wenzel, 2004). The breadth of one’s scope of justice is often based on social norms and personal dispositions (Opatow, 2008), but it expands and contracts in response to situational and social psychological influences (see Opatow, 1988). For example, conflict may contract the boundaries of the scope of justice, as resource allocation decisions are made more on self-interest (or group interest) than on more universal considerations of well-being (Opatow, 2008). Thus those who might previously be our friends and neighbors may become enemies.

As others move out of the category of “friend” into the category of “enemy,” they are moved outside the scope of justice, and “normal” moral rules and social norms can be ignored in our relations with them. As conflict intensifies or becomes intractable, those morally excluded are subject to delegitimization (Bar-Tal, 1989), and harming them becomes justified. As in the example of the Rwandan genocide, those who were formerly “friends” may become recategorized as “enemies,” setting the stage for moral exclusion, harm, and death. Conversely, the end of wars can stimulate the emergence of peacebuilding and inclusion as members of society seek to rebuild their society and form cooperative relationships with those previously considered enemies. Those previously excluded from the scope of justice are extended fairness considerations and allo-

cated resources to rebuild. This new, inclusive relationship may engender self-sacrifice by former enemies to foster each others' well-being.

To summarize, within the scope of justice, treatment of others is consistent with fairness, equitable allocation of resources, and sacrifice of individual well-being to help foster the well-being of others (Opatow, 2008). Social categorization enables the perception of intergroup differences and intergroup differentiation. Motivated by threat or ideological zeal, the boundary of the scope of justice might be drawn closer to the ingroup, resulting in outgroups being more excluded from the scope of justice. Placing other groups outside the scope of justice allows denial of distributive or procedural justice, resources, welfare, and, in extreme forms, facilitates harm or death. Bringing outgroups into the scope of justice potentiates the building of inclusive social relations that can lead to the fostering of human welfare.

Justice boundaries. The scope of justice is a psychological boundary between those to whom justice is or is not applied. These boundaries are contextual and located in accord with social norms and social categorization processes (Opatow, 1990b; Wenzel, 2001). Social norms within cultures may denote those entitled to justice concerns. For example, when considering the justice of wages, one might consider it unjust for a fellow co-worker to be unpaid for his or her labor, while one's spouse might work in his or her household for no pay. Those violating an ingroup's social norms might be excluded from the scope of justice because norm violations represent a threat to group identity (Huo, 2002).

Justice boundaries might also be formed based on social categorization processes. Social categorizations are divisions of a complex social world into subdivisions, which individuals use to locate themselves and others as part of a social system (Oakes, 1996;

Turner, 1982). Social categorization allows us to include ourselves and others within certain groups, and exclude ourselves and others from certain groups. Entitlement to, or exclusion from, justice can be made based on these social categorizations, especially if group memberships are made salient (Wenzel, 2001).

An example of justice boundaries lies in the differential justice often applied toward humans and other organisms. Although one might consider taking another human life unjust, heinous, or morally reprehensible, one might squash a cockroach running across the kitchen floor and feel no sense of injustice doing so. Cattle, pigs, chickens, and other livestock are a part of many people's diet, outside the boundary of justice concerns, and thus morally excluded from the scope of justice that might preclude their killing. These examples illustrate that humans have some intrinsic properties that make their killing indefensible, while the cockroach has certain intrinsic properties that make the killing less reprehensible or even desirable. These properties allow us to categorize the cockroach as "vermin," thus allowing it to be placed outside the scope of justice that protects humans. Similarly, seeing livestock as foodstuff might make their killing more feasible as they have some properties that make their killing justifiable, yet a child who names his or her pet pig "Sally" might see Sally's slaughter as a gross violation of justice; other pigs are categorized as food, but Sally is categorized as pet.

The foregoing helps illustrate the complex contextual and categorization processes inherent in justice boundaries. Insects and animals can be categorized differently from humans and from each other. Killing animals or insects might be contextually justified: Killing a chicken outside the context of food provision might be considered unjust, while it might be just to slaughter a chicken for food, and killing a cockroach in my kitchen might be more easily justified than when encountered on a sidewalk. In terms

of justice boundaries with other people, there are likely analogous social categorization and contextual processes at work in moral exclusion from the scope of justice.

A Psycho-spatial Ordering of Justice Boundaries

The concept of justice boundaries conjures notions of spatial relations. There is a bounded area, the scope of justice, where justice principles are applied, distributive justice is allocated, and individuals and groups are recipients of justice. The notion of a *scope* of justice implies a perceptual process; we see what is in the scope of our vision. Those outside the bounded area are not seen as part of the moral community and thus not entitled to justice. Thus, there is likely a psycho-spatial process active in moral exclusion, where we perceive outgroups as being spatially ordered in our moral universe; some are within the scope of justice, others outside it.

Sociology theory provides two useful concepts in describing this psycho-spatial relationship: *social capital* and *social centrality*. Both of these concepts are useful in understanding how we might spatially order our ingroup and outgroups within our moral universe, either including outgroups in the scope of justice or excluding them from it.

Social centrality. Social centrality is the notion that social relations have and are influenced by spatial characteristics. In terms of the scope of justice, an individual or group may be more or less central to (or included in) justice allocations. Much of this “social spatialization” (Shields, 1991, p. 31) concept springs from the writing of Henri Lefebvre in his criticisms of capitalism and the socio-spatial relations of urban centers. He proposed that the power that maintains dependence and exploitation in a society is ubiquitous, in such forms as a society’s norms, art, commerce, and institutions (Lefebvre, 1976). This relationship represents the social “relations of production” (Lefebvre, 1976, p. 8) whereby a capitalist system maintains itself. Spatially, this concept

is represented by segregated residential and business districts; cities often have “financial centers” and “industrial centers,” as well as suburbs and slums. Social goods and resources are distributed unequally, and sometimes inequitably, across these areas.

When abstracted to social relations, power in a society is often parceled out based on hierarchical relationships between the powerful and the marginalized; the powerful are at the centers of power, while those marginalized are often at the periphery, denied the social power to change the unjust distribution of social goods and resources.

Social centrality, then, is inherent in the concept of moral inclusion in the scope of justice. Social power might be seen as a series of concentric circles, where the innermost circle has the most social power and control of distribution of tangible and intangible goods, while the outermost circles are marginalized populations which are recipients of the distribution and thereby vulnerable to domination and exploitation. Distributive justice requires that individuals or group members have access to allocation of resources, which is often done hierarchically from the centers of social power to those on the periphery of social power. In such cases, inclusion in the scope of justice requires a cross-cutting of hierarchical, power-mediated distribution systems. Ingroup membership might exist “horizontally” within these concentric bands of social power; mutual acquaintances are often drawn from those with similar levels of social power.

Consolidating the concentric circles would involve the decentralization and distribution of power such that all members have full access to the tangible and intangible goods that are part of the distributive justice system, representing full moral inclusion in the scope of justice. Shifting from concentric circles to intersecting ones emphasizes relational aspects of identity (Diani, 2000), making salient the interdependence of social relations and perhaps enabling access to power by those groups that were previously subject to exclusion. As formerly excluded groups gain the social power to change the

distribution of social goods, these groups would become more morally included. Access to social power by marginalized groups depends on the disintegration of these concentric circles of power and the integration of all groups within the distribution of power. Moral exclusion of outgroups might be used as a way to reinforce social centrality by denying access to social power and controlling its distribution.

Social capital. Social capital is a sociological concept that represents the value of social networks or other social structures in helping individuals gain access to the benefits of membership in a community (Portes, 1998). Social capital is often conceptualized as the level of trust between individuals, groups, or institutions (e.g., Uslaner, 2002), and recent experimental research shows that participants judge others as being more trustworthy if the participant is from a group toward whom the participant shows favorable racial bias as measured by the Implicit Associations Test (Stanley, Sokol-Hessner, Banaji, & Phelps, 2011), a demonstration of group-based social capital.

Social capital is obtained by a recipient as a product of the trust extended toward him or her by others; these trusting relationships are the source of the capital. The disposition of others to engage in trusting relationships provides social capital to those within one's own community, which is referred to as "bounded solidarity" (Portes, 1998, p. 8). This ingroup solidarity is an important factor in social capital, and often provides benefits in the form of a basis for reciprocity norms, social and economic support within communities, and feelings of solidarity. This solidarity is referred to as "bonding" social capital, through which people are bonded via a shared social identity (Putnam, 2000; Szreter & Woolcock, 2004).

Bonding social capital has been proposed to be a way groups provide mobility and resources to their members through support from within their ingroups. For exam-

ple, whereas members of minority groups might not be able to obtain loans for business development from a dominant majority, they might receive loans from within the minority community. But the same benefits members of a group accrue through bonding social capital potentiate the exclusion of those outside the group from accessing that same social capital.

“Bridging” social capital is a second form of social capital that allows access to assets and information that might not otherwise be available within a community through relationships with others with a dissimilar social identity (Putnam, 2000; Szreter & Woolcock, 2004). This access comes in the form of intergroup “weak ties” to members of groups outside one’s ingroup and improves information flow, provides job access, and facilitates political organization and integration (Granovetter, 1983). Bridging social capital is important because it is a way for marginalized groups to access resources and power that may be held by dominant groups.

A recent refinement of social capital theory concerns the relationships across explicit, formalized power and authority differentials present in social institutions such as those between students and teachers, patients and doctors, and citizens and police; this has been termed “linking” social capital (Szreter & Woolcock, 2004). It represents the social norms and trusting relations that allow the flow of power, resources, and reciprocal trust between these institutions and those over whom they have power. Especially for those in poor communities, linking social capital has a major effect on welfare (Szreter & Woolcock, 2004). Thus, moral inclusion might be predicated on the willingness of an ingroup to extend bridging and linking social capital to an outgroup.

Social centrality, social capital, and moral exclusion. The theories of social centrality and social capital seem to be closely related to the concept of moral exclusion. For

example, a society with high social centrality would imply that a dominant ingroup controls a society's power, such as political office and resources for business and economic development. At the individual level, moral exclusion would represent the desire by a member of a dominant ingroup to not grant a minority outgroup access to political power and economic resources. Individuals who support social centrality would be more likely to engage in moral exclusion, and measurement of an individual's attitude regarding social centrality at the intergroup level should be a good measure of moral exclusion.

Moral inclusion, on the other hand, might represent a willingness to decentralize the social power by distributing it to the outgroup. This process might be facilitated by the trusting relationships developed as part of bridging and linking social capital as social power and resources flow across group boundaries, cross-cutting the hierarchical power structures that are characteristic of social centrality. Thus, individuals who support bridging and linking social capital with an outgroup should be more morally inclusive. Measurement of social centrality and social capital could be useful in establishing an individual's level of moral exclusion of an outgroup.

Antecedents and Processes of Moral Exclusion

As has been explained earlier, social categorization is paramount in the moral exclusion process. But Deutsch (2006) also makes the important point that the scope of justice is malleable and situationally influenced: justice is allocated to others differentially as a function of both social categorization and the social situation. Those who might, under some conditions, be perceived as within the scope of justice may, under other conditions, be moved outside the scope of justice. Following from this social psychological conception of the scope of justice, Deutsch (2006) proposes three questions central to understanding moral exclusion: (a) what are the social conditions leading to it, (b)

what psychological processes play a role in it, and (c) who is most likely selected as a target for exclusion?

Among *social conditions*, he proposes increases in relative deprivation, political instability, superiority claims, culturally salient violence, little cooperative contact between excluder and excluded, authoritarian social institutions, and lack of observers and objectors to exclusion. He proposes *psychological mechanisms* that help justify exclusion such as appeals to higher moral orders, relabeling exclusion as helpful, minimizing exclusion's impacts, denying personal responsibility, blaming the victim, and becoming emotionally isolated from, and desensitized to, the victim's plight. *Targets* of the exclusion are those who are suppressing inner conflicts, those whose behavior deviates from norms, those who are members of low-power groups, and those who are perceived as threats.

Empirical studies of Deutsch's central questions. Several studies have recently examined moral exclusion from the perspective of some of the factors enumerated in Deutsch's (2006) central questions, specifically relative deprivation, authoritarian social institutions, minimizing exclusion's impacts on those excluded, and intergroup threat. For example, in a study of Australian tax cheating behavior, participants were induced to think of their group membership as Australians, but also as members of their work or occupational category, and asked to rate their tax burden relative to other occupational groups (Wenzel, 2004). Only those with both high occupational group identification and high national group identification showed concern for their occupational group relative to other occupational groups. This study reflects on Deutsch's *relative deprivation* hypothesis in that concern for the ingroup's burden relative to outgroups requires both identification with the ingroup but also identification with a superordinate group. In

other words, in order to form a scope of justice that includes one's own subgroup but excludes other subgroups of the same superordinate group, identification with the superordinate group and subgroup must both be strong. This kind of process might be seen in white supremacist organizations in the United States; they often display American flags and Christianity symbols, which might invoke a strong superordinate identity, while rhetoric and other symbols simultaneously invoke a strong white supremacy subgroup identity. The result is moral inclusion of Americans who are White, and moral exclusion of Americans who are non-White.

Group identification also seems to be active in how individuals justify moral exclusion through *minimizing the impact of exclusion* on an outgroup. This was tested in a study of collective guilt for past injustices done by the ingroup to an outgroup (Miron et al., 2010). Participants in these studies (American undergraduates) read a passage describing damage and death resulting from enslavement of Africans by Americans and completed questionnaires regarding judgment of harm done to Africans, how much injustice had to be perpetrated upon Africans to qualify the United States as a racist nation (standards of injustice), and collective guilt for treatment of African Americans. Ingroup identification as Americans correlated positively with standards of injustice and negatively with perception of harm. Further, a causal path was found where group identification's effects on reduced collective guilt was fully mediated through higher injustice standards and lower perception of harm. Thus, psychologically minimizing the impact that moral exclusion has on an outgroup could serve to reduce collective ingroup guilt, justifying the perpetuation of moral exclusion.

Deutsch (2006) also proposed that *authoritarian social institutions* are a social condition leading to moral exclusion. Supporting this idea are data showing that egalitarian and democratized social structures are related to moral inclusion. As part of a study of

universalism values and moral inclusion, the level of democratization, egalitarianism, and moral inclusion were rated in each of 66 countries (Schwartz, 2007, Study 2). The data showed that democratization and egalitarianism were positively correlated with moral inclusion. Because modern liberal democracy is associated with more pluralistic and less authoritarian political structures (Dahl, 1998; Mouffe, 1996), this finding supports Deutch's (2006) proposal.

Intergroup threat and moral exclusion. While most of the factors that Deutsch (2006) identified as central to moral exclusion have received little or no attention, a notable exception is perception of *intergroup threat*, which has been found to have a direct and mediating effect on social perception and moral exclusion. For example, threats from an outgroup were shown to lead to exaggerated perceptions of both consensus among outgroup members and the extremity of positions held by them (Corneille et al., 2001). Perception of intergroup threat was also found to mediate the relationship between moral exclusion and antipathy toward foreigners held by East German youth (Watts, 1996). Perceived intergroup threat also mediated the relationship between hawkish ideology and moral exclusion of Arabs by Israelis (Maoz & McCauley, 2008).

Intergroup threats perceived by a dominant group are among the best predictors of exclusionary attitudes and prejudice, particularly in the context of a relatively large minority population (McLaren, 2003; Quillian, 1995). Perceived economic and cultural threat was also found to mediate the relationship between level of education and social distance perceived by Israelis toward minority groups in Israel (Halperin et al., 2007). Social distance (Bogardus, 1928, 1933, 1959) measures the propensity for an individual to accept an outgroup member as a member of the individual's family, occupation, community, and world and is conceptually related to moral exclusion (Passini, 2008).

Perceived intergroup threat has also been shown in two studies to mediate the relationship between authoritarianism and moral exclusion. Using an adapted right-wing authoritarianism scale that differentiated between aggressive, submissive, and conventional authoritarianism, it was shown that aggressive and conventional authoritarianism predicted moral exclusion, an effect mediated by perceived threat (Passini, 2008). A recent study of perception of Arab threat among Gaza strip settlers in Israel demonstrated that perceived intergroup threat indirectly mediated the relationship between right-wing authoritarianism and moral exclusion, and that perceived threat was the strongest predictor of moral exclusion (Canetti, Halperin, Hobfoll, Shapira, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009).

This collection of research on perceived threat and moral exclusion demonstrates that an ingroup's perception of threat posed by an outgroup has profound effects on social perception and moral exclusion (Corneille et al., 2001; McLaren, 2003; Quillian, 1995; Watts, 1996). In addition, these effects work in concert with other individual difference factors such as authoritarianism, ideology, affect, and education (Canetti et al., 2009; Halperin et al., 2007; Maoz & McCauley, 2008; Passini, 2008). Because it has demonstrated powerful effects on moral exclusion in a number of different studies conducted in different social and cultural contexts, it is important to understand the dimensions of intergroup threat that affect moral exclusion.

Previous studies of prejudice and intergroup attitudes related to moral exclusion have used perceived threat to cultural values, or conflated cultural and economic threats, so it is not clear whether perceived cultural threat or economic threat is a stronger predictor or more likely to lead to moral exclusion. For example, perceived threat to cultural values was used in one study (i.e., Corneille et al., 2001), and a combined cultural and economic/well-being threat was used in some others (Canetti et al.,

2009; Halperin et al., 2007; Passini, 2008; i.e., Watts, 1996). Only one study has included both cultural and economic/well-being threat as independent predictors (McLaren, 2003).² Only one study has used perceived threats to directly predict moral exclusion (i.e., Passini, 2008), and none has experimentally tested the effects of these threats on moral exclusion.

Theoretical Approaches to Intergroup Threat

As indicated earlier, the study of moral exclusion is relatively new and there has been virtually no research on the direct effects of perceived threat on moral exclusion. Several studies have shown perceived economic and cultural threat to be related to prejudice and attitudes related to moral exclusion. For this reason, the present research proceeds from a theoretical model of intergroup threat that includes analogues of both economic threat and cultural threat: realistic threat and symbolic threat.

Beginning in the mid-1980s, Walter and Cookie Stephan began exploring the effects that fear and ignorance might have on prejudice (Stephan, 1984, 1985). They developed research on two forms of threat that might be causes of prejudice: *intergroup anxiety* and *negative stereotypes*. Soon thereafter, other researchers (e.g., Bobo, 1988; Sears, 1988) were working from realistic conflict theory and symbolic racism theory to develop an understanding of the ways *realistic threats* and *symbolic threats* affect prejudice. Attempting to bring together these four forms of threat into a comprehensive model, Stephan and Stephan (2000) developed *integrated threat theory* (Figure 1). This theory provided a framework for understanding how factors such as ingroup identification, intergroup contact and conflict, relative group status, etc. contribute to the four types of threat and affect intergroup attitudes.




Figure 1. Integrated Threat Theory. Adapted from Stephan and Stephan (2000).

Intergroup threat theory. Further research and refinement of integrated threat theory established that negative stereotypes are a cause of both realistic and symbolic threats, and that intergroup anxiety was a subtype of threat (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). As a result, integrated threat theory was revised to focus on perceived realistic and symbolic threats as sources of intergroup prejudice.

The revised theory, intergroup threat theory (ITT; Stephan et al., 2009), differentiated between threats related to the ingroup as a whole and threats to specific individuals. Group symbolic threat refers to threats to the group's religion, values, beliefs, ideology, and worldview. Individual symbolic threat refers to threats to the individual's self-esteem, self-identity, or honor. Group realistic threat refers to threats to the ingroup's power, resources, and group well-being. Individual realistic threat refers to threats to the individual's health, personal security, or material resources.

Symbolic threat. At the group level, symbolic threats are threats that an outgroup poses to the ingroup's core values, morals, beliefs, attitudes, and norms (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). ITT proposes that these threats arise, in part, because the ingroup members believe their system of values is morally right. Although symbolic threats are part of many prominent social psychology theories (e.g., symbolic racism, social dominance theory, ambivalence-amplification theory, etc.), these theories differ from ITT in two important ways (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). First, other theories often conceptualize perceived threat to an ingroup's values as a form of prejudice (Bobo, 1988), making threat indistinguishable from prejudice. ITT conceptualizes perceived threat as a *cause* of prejudice. Second, these other theoretical approaches have sometimes combined symbolic and realistic threats in their measurements, thus making the distinction unclear. For example, the symbolic racism scale includes outgroup gains in political power

as a symbolic threat (Bobo, 1983). Threats to the dominant group's power are better aligned with realistic threat, because power is not a value, belief, or moral position, but rather a resource the dominant group uses to its advantage.

Realistic threat. Group realistic threats are threats to the ingroup's instrumental interests, particularly the ingroup's resources, power, status, and welfare (Bobo, 1988; Stephan, 2000, 2009). The concept of realistic threat derives from realistic group conflict theory (RGCT; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966), but the conception of threat under RGCT is different from that under ITT. RGCT limited itself to competition for scarce resources, whereas ITT's conception of realistic threat is broader, encompassing resources such as power and status and also by including group well-being as part of realistic threat (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). In addition, RGCT dealt with more objective threats, whereas ITT's conception of realistic threat is based in the individual's subjective perceptions of realistic threat. Ingroup members may infer realistic threats that are not actually present, and these perceptions are important regardless of the objective presence of threats.

Consequences of threat. As intergroup threat increases, ethnocentrism, intolerance, opposition to policies favoring the outgroup, condoning more extreme behaviors to protect the ingroup, and justification of violence against the outgroup are likely cognitive outcomes of perceived threat (Stephan et al., 2009). As threat increases, it is also likely that emotional outcomes will also contribute to the likelihood of moral exclusion. Fear, anger, resentment, contempt, and disgust have been observed in empirical studies of threat (Stephan et al., 2009). To the degree that these emotions are experienced as group-based emotions toward an outgroup, they could lead to moral exclusion or harm of outgroup members. In fact, group-based anger mediates the relationship between in-

group collective support and offensive behavioral tendencies toward an outgroup (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000).

ITT proposes that intergroup threat is leads to behavioral outcomes such as “policing of intergroup boundaries” (Stephan et al., 2009, p. 52), whereby inclusion or exclusion of members is made on increasingly strict criteria. Threats to an ingroup’s core values via a deviant ingroup member have been shown to trigger exclusion of the deviant from the ingroup’s boundary as a way of neutralizing this symbolic threat to the ingroup (Eidelman, Silvia, & Biernat, 2006). This exclusion is a direct analogue to moral exclusion and removal from the scope of justice that might result from perceived symbolic threats from an outgroup.

According to ITT, symbolic threats are predicted to be especially likely to elicit cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses that would lead to moral exclusion, dehumanization, and delegitimization (Stephan et al., 2009). This is because symbolic threats jeopardize the ingroup’s core values and, in that sense, the existence and cohesion of the ingroup, and so may engender fervent responses to neutralize the threat. In contrast, realistic threats might be more associated with pragmatic, coping-based responses to the threat (Stephan et al., 2009). This is because an outgroup’s access to an ingroup’s resources can be negotiated, especially if the ingroup is in a dominant power position.

In the face of symbolic threat, there may be no possible negotiation or middle-ground where a group’s core values are concerned; thus, the only way to neutralize the threat is through moral exclusion. The non-negotiable nature of symbolic conflict would make it a form of zero-sum conflict, where the core values will be “ours” or “theirs,” and “winning” requires the exclusion or elimination of the outgroup to preserve the ingroup’s core values. A recent test of the effects of zero-sum intergroup conflict on moral

exclusion showed that when the concerns of an ingroup conflict with the concerns of the outgroup, and the conflict is zero-sum, then ingroup members devalue outgroup members and prefer certain loss of outgroup lives over possible losses of ingroup lives (Pratto & Glasford, 2008).

Summary

Justice is a process whereby individuals and groups engaged in exchange relations are ensured treatment that is fair in relation to others in the exchange relationship (Deutsch, 2006). Those to whom individuals apply justice principles are considered to be within the individual's moral community, a psycho-spatial region bounded by the scope of justice. Moral exclusion occurs when the scope of justice is drawn close to the individual or the ingroup, so that others are excluded from the moral community (Opatow, 1990b). When others are morally excluded, considerations of fairness do not apply, and allocations of resources and self-sacrifice are not made on their behalf. They can be denied access to social power and resources, and kept in a state of exploitation.

Group identity provides a useful heuristic to the moral exclusion process by making it easy to identify who is part of the scope of justice. Social categorization allows individuals to discriminate who is part of the scope of justice based on group membership (Wenzel, 2009). Individuals who are ingroup members are usually included in the scope of justice; those who are outgroup members might be denied justice based on group membership. Groups that are categorized as deviant, abhorrent, or threatening are likely to be excluded from the scope of justice and their members can be denied justice (Deutsch, 2006).

Intergroup threat is an important factor in moral exclusion and had been shown empirically to be related to attitudes and prejudice indicative of moral exclusion (e.g., Canetti et al., 2009; Corneille et al., 2001; Halperin et al., 2007; Maoz & McCauley, 2008;

McLaren, 2003; Passini, 2008; Quillian, 1995; Watts, 1996). Two particular forms of threat, symbolic and realistic, have been proposed to be causes of prejudice and moral exclusion (Stephan et al., 2009). Symbolic threat represents threats to ingroup core values and cohesion, so it should be especially likely to be associated with the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses that might lead to moral exclusion from the scope of justice.

Conceptual hypotheses

The present research works from moral exclusion theory and intergroup threat theory to hypothesize predictable relationships between intergroup threat and moral exclusion from the scope of justice. Moral exclusion theory proposes that one antecedent of moral exclusion is intergroup threat (Deutsch, 2006), and previous research has demonstrated that intergroup threats to an ingroup's culture and economics are associated with prejudice and attitudes consistent with moral exclusion (e.g., Canetti, Halperin, Hobfoll, Shapira, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009; Corneille, Yzerbyt, Rogier, & Buidin, 2001; Halperin, Pedahzur, & Canetti-Nisim, 2007; McLaren, 2003; Passini, 2008; Watts, 1996). ITT proposes that perceived outgroup threat is a cause of prejudice toward an outgroup, and that threats to an ingroup's values, morals, and cultural worldview (symbolic or cultural threats) represent threats to the group's core values and cohesion, so symbolic threats are particularly likely to elicit attitudes and behaviors consistent with moral exclusion (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009).

Therefore, it can be expected that greater intergroup threat will be associated with greater moral exclusion. It can also be expected that threats to an ingroup's values, morals, and worldview (cultural/symbolic threats) and threats to an ingroup's resources or power (economic/realistic threats) will both be associated with greater moral exclusion, but that the relationship will be stronger for symbolic threats. It can be ex-

pected that symbolic and realistic threats perceived to be posed by an outgroup are a cause of moral exclusion from the scope of justice, and that the causal relationship could be mediated by prejudice toward the outgroup.

Statement of Problem

Social groups are formed when individuals collectively perceive themselves as a group, sharing a common identity with shared values, norms, and beliefs, and experiencing interdependence with each other (Turner, 1987). However, experiments in minimal group formation have shown that mere categorization of the self and others into group membership is sufficient to give rise to group cohesion and intergroup perception and discrimination (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Turner, Sachdev, & Hogg, 1983). This results in the formation of psychological groups that show collective behavior related to their group membership consistent with group identity, as well as behavior toward other groups based on group identity. This group identity process often gives rise to beneficial outcomes for the group in the form of ingroup bias that helps raise intergroup distinctiveness (Turner, 1987), but this same bias can give rise to discrimination against outgroups.

When an individual is perceived as part of an ingroup, he or she is usually treated with the same high standards of fair treatment that ingroup members expect from other ingroup members; he or she is part of the ingroup members' moral community (Deutsch, 1985) and within the scope of justice (Opatow, 1990b). Those who are deviant ingroup members, or members of outgroups perceived to have divergent social identities and perceived be a threat to the ingroup, may be extracted from our moral community, placed outside the scope of justice, and subjected to treatment with standards of justice lesser than those within the scope of justice. This moral exclusion creates a precipitating condition for perpetration of direct or structural violence against those out-

side the scope of justice, often in the service of protecting the ingroup from some perceived threat.

The influence of perceived threats on moral exclusion is the topic of the present investigation. The existing literature on threat's effects has found symbolic threats (threats to a dominant ingroup's values, morals, beliefs, and worldview) and realistic threats (threats to resources and welfare) to be predictive of prejudice and attitudes related to moral exclusion (i.e., Canetti et al., 2009; Corneille et al., 2001; Halperin et al., 2007; McLaren, 2003; Passini, 2008; Watts, 1996). These previous studies have sometimes conflated symbolic and realistic threat and have only measured prejudice and attitudes related to moral exclusion. Therefore, what is unclear from the literature is whether symbolic and realistic threats are directly related to moral exclusion, what independent contribution symbolic and realistic threats make to moral exclusion, and whether symbolic and realistic threats cause moral exclusion.

Experimental context of the present studies

In order to better understand the relationship between perceived symbolic and realistic threat and moral exclusion, two studies have been conducted. The first study sought to establish that perceived symbolic and realistic threat posed by an outgroup are correlated with moral exclusion toward that outgroup. ITT proposes that symbolic and realistic threats are a cause of prejudice (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009), and prejudice has been shown to be positively correlated with moral exclusion (Leighton, Passini, Ricca, Shelden, & Schroeder, 2012). It would be expected, therefore, that greater symbolic and/or realistic threat would be associated with greater moral exclusion.

The second study was conducted to establish whether experimentally induced symbolic and/or realistic threats from an outgroup cause increased moral exclusion. Prior research showed that when symbolic and realistic threats toward an immigrant

outgroup were induced experimentally, the combined symbolic and realistic threats led to more negative attitudes (i.e., dislike, rejection, unfriendliness, resentment, disrespect, and disapproval) toward the outgroup (Stephan, 2005; see also Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001; Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998). If intergroup symbolic and/or realistic threats are a cause of prejudice, and prejudice is correlated with moral exclusion, two possibilities exist for the causal relationship from intergroup threat to moral exclusion. The first is that intergroup threat directly causes moral exclusion. The second is that perceived threat causes prejudice, which mediates the relationship between perceived threat and moral exclusion. The present research is the first empirical test of these hypotheses.

Study 1

It is generally hypothesized in the present studies that intergroup threats will be associated with moral exclusion of an outgroup from the scope of justice. Study 1 tests the hypothesis that moral exclusion of an outgroup will be positively correlated with symbolic and realistic threats perceived to be posed by that outgroup. While both symbolic and realistic threats are expected to be correlated with moral exclusion, ITT predicts that because symbolic threat represent a threat to the group's identity, symbolic threat may be especially likely to elicit moral exclusion.

Method

Participants

One hundred fifty participants were recruited from the introductory psychology subject pool at the University of Arkansas, for which participants received course credit. The participants responded to a solicitation for an experiment entitled "Thinking About People." Participants were required to be at least 18 years old.

Eleven participants reported being either Latino or first- or second-generation immigrants of the countries included in the moral exclusion measure and were excluded from the analysis. The remaining 139 participants had a mean age of 19.8 years old ($SD = 3.6$), and most were women ($N = 94$, 67.6%). One hundred twenty-one participants (87.1%) self-reported race as white, six (4.3%) Black, two (1.4%) Native American, two (1.4%) Asian, and eight (5.8%) multiple race.

Design

Predictor and criterion variables. The primary goal of the present study was to examine the relationship between moral exclusion from the scope of justice and the perceived symbolic and realistic threats posed by an immigrant outgroup. Thus, Study 1 was a correlational study, with three variables of interest: perceived symbolic threat, perceived realistic threat, and moral exclusion from the scope of justice.

Predictor variables. The two predictor variables in the present study were perceived symbolic and realistic threat. These were measured using scales that have previously been used to measure perceived threat's effects on prejudice and attitudes toward immigrant groups (Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). The scales use a seven-point Likert-style response format, anchored with "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree".

The symbolic threat scale (see Appendix A) includes items assessing how much threat an immigrant outgroup represents to ingroup values, morals, and beliefs. Sample items include "Immigration from [outgroup] is undermining American culture," and "The values and beliefs of [outgroup] immigrants regarding moral and religious issues are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans." The scale has previously demonstrated moderate internal consistency with Cronbach's $\alpha = .68$ (Stephan,

Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). In the present study, the scale had a Cronbach's α level of .71.

The realistic threat scale (see Appendix B) includes items such as "[outgroup] immigration has increased the tax burden on Americans," and "[outgroup] immigrants are not displacing American workers from their jobs." When correlated with outgroup attitudes, this scale shows larger correlations than other measures of realistic threat (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). The scale has previously demonstrated good internal consistency with Cronbach's $\alpha = .82$ (Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). In the present study, the scale had a Cronbach's α level of .81.

The target outgroup used for the measurement of symbolic and realistic threat in this study was Mexican immigrants. This group was chosen largely because Latino immigrants have been identified in a recent national representative survey to elicit the most worry about the effects they might have on American communities (Valentino, Brader, & Jardina, 2011). Also, Mexican immigrants have been shown in data recently collected by the author, using the population under study (University of Arkansas undergraduates), to be subject to greater moral exclusion than other outgroups (e.g., French, Canadians). In addition, the most recent U.S. census data (2010) show Latinos are the largest immigrant group in Arkansas (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012b), and Mexicans comprise the largest nationality among Hispanics in the state (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012a); thus, the group is likely salient to participants in the present research.

Criterion variables. The main criterion variable of interest was the Inclusion/Exclusion of Other Groups (IEG) scale (Passini, 2010; Appendix C) that measures the degree to which a set of target outgroups are considered part of the scope of justice. The scale consists of 4 items on a semantic differential scale that measure (a) the degree

to which various outgroups are seen as a threat/opportunity to ingroup well-being, (b) how much they deserve no respect/utmost respect, (c) interest in avoiding contact/engaging in constructive contact with the outgroups, and (d) how uncivilized/civilized the outgroups are. The scale ranges from -3 (most exclusionary) to +3 (most inclusionary).

The IEG measure asks participants to evaluate each of several outgroups on the four items above. The immigrant outgroups used in the scale for the present studies (Canadian, Mexican; French, Italian; Chinese, Korean) were chosen to represent a large potential moral universe. They were paired in geographical proximity, and had varying levels of similarity to, and dissimilarity from, the participants. When all outgroups in the scale are considered together, the scale can be an indicator of the breadth of an individual's scope of justice across diverse groups in the individual's potential moral universe.

The IEG measure correlates with social distance ($r_s = -.42$ to $-.66$), self-concept as a world citizen ($r = .32$), blatant prejudice and subtle prejudice ($r_s = -.64$ and $-.49$, respectively), and social dominance orientation ($r = -.53$). The scale has shown high internal consistency (Cronbach's $\alpha = .91$ to $.96$; Passini & Morselli, 2011). The IEG scale is valenced such that positive scores represent greater moral inclusion, while negative scores represent greater exclusion. In order to maintain consistency with the concept of moral exclusion, however, the scores on this scale were reversed for analysis such that positive scores represent moral exclusion in this study.

The IEG measure includes one item that directly assesses perceived threat ("Values held by this group represent a [threat/opportunity] to our well-being"). It is possible that the results obtained on this question in the IEG will simply be a measure of per-

ceived threat rather than measuring moral exclusion, creating a potential confound with the predictor variables. Therefore, a second measure of moral exclusion was developed for this study to overcome any confounding effects of the manipulation of threat and the moral exclusion measurement.

The Leighton Moral Exclusion Scale (LMES; see Appendix D) includes 18 items measured on a 7-point Likert-style scale anchored with “disagree strongly” and “agree strongly.” The scale is valenced such that higher scores indicate greater moral exclusion. This new measure of moral exclusion was included among the criterion variables in this study to avoid the potential confound with threat presented by the IEG and to provide some concurrent validity for the IEG.

The LMES has 12 items measuring Opatow’s three elements of the scope of justice: allocation of resources, sacrifice for the well-being of the outgroup, and considerations of fairness. *Allocation of resources* is measured by five statements that public resources should be used for the benefit of the outgroup. *Sacrifice for well-being* is measured by three statements that the welfare of the outgroup should be improved even if it means sacrificing the ingroup’s needs. *Consideration of fairness* is measured by four statements that the outgroup should be taken advantage of by the ingroup and give into the ingroup’s demands. This measurement of consideration of fairness was based on a definition of fairness provided by Rawls (1958): fair relations are predicated on the perception that neither party is taken advantage of nor forced to give into the demands of the other.

The LMES also includes six items measuring two important dimensions of moral inclusion: social centrality and social capital. Social centrality (Lefebvre, 1976; Nagle, 2009) is a psycho-spatial ordering of hierarchical power structures in a society whereby marginalized groups are excluded from the centers of power. Social capital (Putnam,

2000; Uslaner, 2002) is the degree to which groups are connected in a cross-cutting of social and power hierarchies, and implies a level of reciprocal trust. Social capital enables the movement of resources and power across these hierarchies. The concepts of social capital and social centrality emerge from sociological theory and have not previously been addressed in moral exclusion research.

For the present study, the target outgroup for the LMES was limited to Mexican immigrants because the length of the measure would have been excessive with the inclusion of multiple outgroups. Further development of the LMES might create a version appropriate for a broader measurement of the scope of justice across the moral universe, along the lines of the IEG measure.

Control variable. It is plausible that moral exclusion may be driven solely by general prejudice against the outgroup. The present study included a measure of prejudice so that its effect in the relationship between perceived threats and moral exclusion could be statistically controlled. Participants were measured for their level of general prejudice toward each of the target immigrant groups (French, Mexican, Canadian, Korean, Italian, and Chinese). This was done using a “feeling thermometer” type instrument (e.g. Campbell, 1971; Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993; McConahay, 1986; Miller, Smith, & Mackie, 2004; Olson, 2009; Pearson, 2010; Valentino et al., 2011) that presented a horizontal bar shaded in gradations from white to black, below which were temperatures in 10° increments from 0° to 100°, and anchored “Very Cold Feeling” and “Very Warm Feeling.” Participants indicated below the thermometer their feeling in degrees toward each immigrant group.

The feeling thermometer is valenced such that higher scores represent more positive feelings. In order to make interpretation more consistent with the concept of preju-

dice, the scores were reversed for analysis such that higher scores represent greater prejudice in this study.

Procedure

Participants were tested in group testing situations with group size ranging from 10 to 16 participants. After being greeted by the experimenter, they were seated at opposite ends of long tables to preserve confidentiality of their responses. They then completed questionnaire packets containing a demographic questionnaire (Appendix E) followed by the scales measuring perceived symbolic threat (Appendix A) and realistic threat (Appendix B), the IEG scale (Appendix C), the prejudice scale, and the LMES (Appendix D).³ All participants completed the packets, after which they were debriefed, thanked for their participation, and released from the experiment.

Results

Internal Consistency

All measures used showed moderate to high internal consistency as demonstrated by Cronbach's α levels. The symbolic and realistic threat scales had α levels of .71 and .81, respectively. The IEG scale had an $\alpha = .96$, and the LMES showed an overall $\alpha = .92$. The means, standard deviations, and number of subjects for each measure are included in Table 1.

Bivariate correlations

Pearson's correlation coefficients were calculated to examine the relationships between the variables of interest. The LMES included only Mexican immigrants as the target group, whereas the IEG included Mexican immigrants along with other groups. To aid comparison between the LMES and IEG scores, the IEG score for just the Mexican immigrant group was included in the results in addition to the overall IEG score (which includes all immigrant groups combined).

Table 1

Means, Standard Deviations, and Number of Participants for All Variables in Study 1.

Variable	Mean	SD	N
Symbolic threat	4.01	0.93	139
Realistic threat	3.73	1.01	139
Prejudice (all groups)	31.90	18.07	138
Prejudice (Mexican only)	38.84	22.63	138
IEG (all groups)	-1.53	0.98	136
IEG, Mexican only	-1.13	1.27	136
LMES	3.15	1.06	139

It was hypothesized in the present study that moral exclusion of an outgroup, as measured by the IEG and LMES scales, will be positively correlated with symbolic and realistic threats perceived to be posed by that outgroup, as measured by the symbolic and realistic threat scales. All correlations were significant and in the expected direction (Table 2). The IEG scores correlated with both symbolic threat and realistic threat (both $r_s = .53, p_s < .001$). The IEG scores for Mexican immigrants only also correlated with symbolic ($r = .62, p < .001$) and realistic threat ($r = .63, p < .001$). The LMES scores had the highest correlation with symbolic ($r = .72, p < .001$) and realistic threat ($r = .77, p < .001$).

Because prejudice was correlated with the moral exclusion scales ($r_s = .48$ to $.61, p_s < .001$), it could account for at least part of the correlation between moral exclusion and symbolic and realistic threat. To test this, partial correlation coefficients were calculated to statistically control for the influence of prejudice. The correlation coefficients were reduced but remained significant (Table 3). In computing the partial correlation coefficient for the IEG scale, the mean prejudice score for all six immigrant outgroups was used. After controlling for the effect of prejudice, IEG scores were significantly correlated with symbolic ($r = .36, p < .001$) and realistic threat ($r = .38, p < .001$). Prejudice scores for only the Mexican immigrant outgroup were used in calculating the partial correlation coefficients for the IEG (Mexican only) score and the LMES score. After controlling for prejudice, IEG (Mexican only) scores were significantly correlated with symbolic ($r = .46, p < .001$) and realistic threat ($r = .47, p < .001$), and the LMES scores were also correlated with symbolic ($r = .63, p < .001$) and realistic threat ($r = .68, p < .001$).

Table 2

Pearson Correlation Coefficients (and Degrees of Freedom) Among Study Variables for Study 1

Measures	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Prejudice, all groups	—					
2. Prejudice, Mexican only	.77 (136)	—				
3. Symbolic threat	.46 (136)	.49 (136)	—			
4. Realistic threat	.43 (136)	.51 (136)	.68 (137)	—		
5. IEG	.59 (133)	.50 (133)	.53 (134)	.53 (134)	—	
6. IEG, Mexican only	.60 (133)	.61 (133)	.62 (134)	.63 (134)	.89 (134)	—
7. LMES	.48 (136)	.53 (136)	.72 (137)	.77 (137)	.64 (134)	.73 (134)

Note: All coefficients are significant at $p < .001$

Table 3

Partial Correlation Coefficients (and Degrees of Freedom) for Symbolic and Realistic Threat and Moral Exclusion Measures, Controlling for Prejudice for Study 1

Measures	Symbolic threat	Realistic threat
IEG	.36 (132)	.38 (132)
IEG, Mexican only	.46 (132)	.47 (132)
LMES	.63 (135)	.68 (137)

Notes: All coefficients are significant at $p < .001$. Mean prejudice for all outgroups used for IEG. Prejudice for Mexican outgroup used for IEG (Mexican only) and LMES.

Regression analysis

Although both symbolic and realistic threats are expected to be correlated with moral exclusion, ITT predicts that because symbolic threat represent a threat to the group's identity, symbolic threat may be especially likely to elicit moral exclusion. To better understand the unique predictive relationships between symbolic and realistic threat and moral exclusion, a multiple regression was used. The analysis strategy used a moderated multiple regression technique (e.g., Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen & Cohen, 1983) to assess the relative predictive power of perceived symbolic threat and perceived realistic threats on the moral exclusion measures after accounting for general prejudice. Separate hierarchical regression analyses were conducted for each criterion variable. Each of the predictors was centered by subtracting the mean of the predictor from each score (e.g., Aiken & West, 1991). In Step 1, the prejudice measure was entered into the equation as the covariate; in Step 2 the two predictors, symbolic and realistic threat, were simultaneously entered; in Step 3 the interaction term was entered as the product term of symbolic and realistic threat.⁴ This procedure was done for each of the criterion variables: IEG, IEG (Mexican only), and the LMES. For the IEG criterion variable, the mean prejudice scores for all outgroups was used as the covariate. For the IEG (Mexican only) and LMES, the prejudice score for the Mexican immigrant outgroup only was used as the covariate. Preliminary analyses showed the data to be free from violation of assumption of normality, and all components had tolerance scores greater than .10 and variance inflation factor (VIF) scores smaller than 10, indicating multicollinearity was not a problem.

IEG. For the IEG using all groups, prejudice was calculated by using the mean feeling thermometer values for all outgroups. In Step 1, prejudice strongly predicted

IEG scores ($\beta = .59$) and explained 35% of variance in IEG scores, $F(1,133) = 71.36, p < .001$. In Step 2, prejudice remained the strongest predictor of IEG scores ($\beta = .41$), but perceived symbolic and realistic threat uniquely predicted IEG scores (β s = .19 and .23 respectively), $F(3,131) = 37.64, p < .001$, and explained an additional 12% of variance, $F_{\text{change}}(2,131) = 13.60, p < .001$. Step 3 showed no significant increase in explained variance, indicating the interaction term did not contribute to predicting IEG scores (see Table 4).

IEG (Mexican Only). For the IEG (Mexican only), the feeling thermometer score for the Mexican immigrant outgroup was used as the measure of prejudice. In Step 1, prejudice strongly predicted IEG scores ($\beta = .61$) and explained 37% of variance in IEG scores, $F(1,133) = 77.92, p < .001$. In Step 2, prejudice remained the strongest predictor of IEG scores ($\beta = .34$), but perceived symbolic and realistic threat uniquely predicted IEG scores (β s = .26 and .28 respectively), $F(3,131) = 51.60, p < .001$, and explained an additional 17% of variance, $F_{\text{change}}(2,131) = 24.61, p < .001$. Step 3 showed no significant increase in explained variance, indicating the interaction terms did not contribute to predicting IEG (Mexican only) scores (see Table 5).

LMES. For the LMES, the feeling thermometer score toward Mexican immigrants only was used as the measure of prejudice. In Step 1, prejudice strongly predicted LMES scores ($\beta = .54$) and explained 28% of variance in LMES scores, $F(1,136) = 52.61, p < .001$. In Step 2, prejudice was the weakest predictor of LMES scores ($\beta = .12$), and perceived symbolic and realistic threat uniquely predicted LMES scores ($\beta = .35$ and .47 respectively), $F(3,134) = 91.89, p < .001$, and explained an additional 39% of variance, $F_{\text{change}}(2,134) = 80.70, p < .001$. Step 3 showed no significant increase in explained

Table 4

Regression Analysis Summary for Symbolic and Realistic Threat as Predictors of IEG, Controlling for General Prejudice for Study 1

	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Step 1			
Constant	1.51	0.07	
Prejudice (all groups)	0.03	0.00	.59***
Step 2			
Constant	1.50	0.06	
Prejudice	0.02	0.00	.41***
Symbolic threat	0.20	0.10	.19*
Realistic threat	0.23	0.09	.23**
Step 3			
Constant	1.50	0.07	
Prejudice	0.02	0.00	.41***
Symbolic threat	0.20	0.10	.19*
Realistic threat	0.23	0.09	.23**
Symbolic X realistic threat	0.01	0.05	.02

Note: $R^2 = .35$ for Step 1, $p < .001$; $\Delta R^2 = .12$ for Step 2, $p < .001$; $\Delta R^2 = .00$ for Step 3, $p = .796$.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 5

Regression Analysis Summary for Symbolic and Realistic Threat as Predictors of IEG Scores for the Mexican Outgroup Only, Controlling for General Prejudice for Study 1

	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Step 1			
Constant	1.36	0.09	
Prejudice (Mexican only)	0.03	0.00	.61***
Step 2			
Constant	1.24	0.08	
Prejudice	0.02	0.00	.34***
Symbolic threat	0.36	0.11	.26**
Realistic threat	0.36	0.11	.28**
Step 3			
Constant	1.29	0.09	
Prejudice	0.02	0.00	.34***
Symbolic threat	0.37	0.11	.27**
Realistic threat	0.37	0.11	.27**
Symbolic X Realistic threat	0.08	0.06	.08

Note: $R^2 = .37$ for Step 1, $p < .001$; $\Delta R^2 = .17$ for Step 2, $p < .001$; $\Delta R^2 = .01$ for Step 3, $p = .172$

** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

variance, indicating the interaction terms did not contribute to predicting LMES scores (see Table 6).

To test for significant differences between the predictive power of symbolic threat and realistic threat in Step 2 of each regression, a procedure for post-hoc comparisons of correlations from the same sample was used (Steiger, 1980; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). For IEG, IEG (Mexican only), and LMES as criterion variables, there were no significant differences between symbolic threat and realistic threat as predictors in Step 2, Steiger's $Z = .402, .048, \text{ and } -.748$ respectively.

Discussion

The results of the present study support Hypothesis 1, that greater perceived cultural and/or economic threats from an outgroup should be associated with greater moral exclusion. Perceived symbolic and realistic threat represented by a Mexican immigrant outgroup were measured along with moral exclusion using two different instruments, and it was found that moral exclusion of Mexican immigrants was positively correlated with both symbolic and realistic threat. It was also found that both symbolic and realistic threats uniquely predicted moral exclusion scores after taking into account the effect of prejudice on moral exclusion. This finding is consistent with previous research findings that both of these threats uniquely predict variance in attitudes toward outgroups (Riek et al., 2006).

When moral exclusion was measured for multiple immigrant outgroups as was done in the overall IEG measure, perceived symbolic and realistic threat posed by Mexican immigrants was associated with increased moral exclusion for all groups, not just the Mexican outgroup. Thus, these threats may generalize to other immigrant outgroups or perhaps even to non-immigrant outgroups. This result indicates that

Table 6

Regression Analysis Summary for Symbolic and Realistic Threat as Predictors of the LMES, Controlling for General Prejudice for Study 1

	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Step 1			
Constant	2.98	0.08	
Prejudice (Mexican only)	0.02	0.00	.54***
Step 2			
Constant	3.12	0.06	
Prejudice	0.01	0.00	.12*
Symbolic threat	0.39	0.08	.34***
Realistic threat	0.50	0.07	.47***
Step 3			
Constant	3.08	0.06	
Prejudice	0.01	0.00	.12*
Symbolic threat	0.40	0.08	.35***
Realistic threat	0.49	0.07	.47***
Symbolic X Realistic threat	0.07	0.04	.08

Note: $R^2 = .28$ for Step 1, $p < .001$; $\Delta R^2 = .39$ for Step 2, $p < .001$; $\Delta R^2 = .01$ for Step 3, $p = .116$

* $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$

perceived symbolic and realistic threats posed by one outgroup may have the effect of shrinking the scope of justice as it encompasses other outgroups in one's moral universe. In this case, all of the outgroups were immigrant outgroups, so it may be that this scope of justice contraction applies to outgroups with a similar social categorization (immigrants). Additional research to test the effects of these threats on moral exclusion of dissimilarly categorized outgroups (e.g. immigrants vs. homosexuals) could illuminate the scope of this threat generalization.

After controlling for prejudice, there were no significant differences in the relative power of either symbolic or realistic threats to predict moral exclusion in the present study. This is contrary to ITT, which proposes that symbolic threats should better predict moral exclusion (Stephan et al., 2009). To my knowledge, this is the first empirical test of this hypothesis. Further studies can establish whether this finding is replicable. Although prejudice has a strong effect on moral exclusion, the present study demonstrated that perceived symbolic and realistic threats predict moral exclusion uniquely from general prejudice. An interesting and unexpected finding was that the IEG measure of moral exclusion from the scope of justice is prone to being more strongly affected by prejudice than by perceived symbolic and realistic threats, whereas the LMES is more strongly predicted by these perceived threats than by prejudice. In other words, compared with the IEG measure, the LMES appears to be more sensitive to exclusion in the context of symbolic and realistic threat than it is to exclusion based on generalized prejudice.

It is possible that the difference in sensitivity to prejudice of the IEG and LMES may be due to intergroup emotions. Under Intergroup Emotion Theory (Mackie et al., 2000; Miller et al., 2004), when in situations where group membership is salient, individuals experience emotions based in part on their group memberships. If the individu-

al appraises the outgroup as negatively impacting the ingroup (e.g. threatening), then negative emotions (e.g., fear, anger) could be experienced as a product of group membership. The outgroup will then be the target of these emotions, which will in turn affect prejudice. In fact, intergroup emotion, particularly negative emotion, has been shown to be the largest predictor of prejudice, over and above stereotypes, intergroup contact, and social dominance orientation (Miller et al., 2004).

If an individual is experiencing negative intergroup emotion, and thus greater prejudice toward the outgroup, and if the IEG measure is more prone than the LMES to measure responses based on intergroup emotions, then the IEG may be more strongly influenced by prejudice as a function of intergroup emotion. The IEG measure includes items that would seem on their face to be more sensitive to affect (i.e., threat/opportunity, disrespect/respect, avoid/engage in contact, and uncivilized/civilized). In contrast, the LMES uses items focused on decisions for allocating tangible and intangible social goods (e.g., political power, economic resources, fairness, trust). Thus, compared with the LMES, moral exclusion measured using the IEG may be more affected by prejudice as a product of negative intergroup emotion.

Study 2

The results of Study 1 supported the hypothesis that perceived symbolic and realistic threats are positively correlated with moral exclusion and a contraction of the scope of justice. It was also found that both symbolic and realistic threat uniquely predicted moral exclusion, over and above prejudice. It is also of interest to know whether this relationship is causal. That is, when an ingroup member is induced to perceive an outgroup as posing a symbolic and/or realistic threat to the ingroup, is this perceived threat a cause of greater moral exclusion? Consistent with ITT, it is generally hypothe-

sized in the present study that both symbolic and realistic threats should be causally related to moral exclusion, and that this relationship may be mediated by prejudice toward the outgroup. Although ITT proposes that symbolic threats should be especially likely to be related to moral exclusion, the result of Study 1 did not support this prediction. Therefore, no specific hypothesis can be made for the relative weight of symbolic threat over realistic threat in inducing moral exclusion in the present study.

Method

Participants

Eighty-seven participants were recruited from the introductory psychology subject pool at the University of Arkansas. The participants responded to a solicitation for an experiment entitled "Thinking About People," for which participants received course credit. Participants were required to be at least 18 years old.

Five participants were excluded from analysis because they self-identified as of Latino ethnicity, two of whom were first or second-generation immigrants from the countries included in the IEG measure. The remaining 82 participants were mostly women ($N = 62, 75.6\%$) and had a mean age of 19.2 years old ($SD = 3.4$). Most self-identified race as White ($N = 72, 87.8\%$), two (2.4%) as Asian, one (1.2%) as Black, and seven (8.5%) as multiple race.

Design

Study 2 was concerned with the causal effects of symbolic and realistic threats on moral exclusion. Thus, there were two independent variables of interest: symbolic threat and realistic threat (Stephan et al., 1999; Stephan et al., 2009). The design was a 2 (symbolic threat present vs. absent) \times 2 (realistic threat present vs. absent) between-subjects factorial experiment.

Procedure

Participants in groups of size 12–16 completed an informed consent form followed by a questionnaire packet. The first page of the packet was a demographic questionnaire (Appendix E). This was followed by a page containing the stimulus materials—newspaper articles purportedly from the web page of a major national newspaper, but actually written for this study by the author.⁵ The articles described a recently released report by the “National Commission on Immigration,” made up of experts on immigration. Participants were instructed to read the article, thinking about how much it would affect “you, and Americans like you,” over the next 3–7 years.

There were four versions of the article, representing each of the conditions in the experiment. The *realistic threat present, symbolic threat absent* condition described the drain on the economy created by immigration from Mexico and its effect on university education through reduced scholarships and increased class sizes and tuition cost (Appendix F). The *symbolic threat present, realistic threat absent* condition described the threat to American culture from Spanish language replacing the use of English and immigrants forcing changes to higher education by disrupting traditions and values (Appendix G). The *realistic threat present, symbolic threat present* condition included both of the above arguments (Appendix H), and the *realistic threat absent, symbolic threat absent* condition described the report as detailing the financial and personal costs incurred by immigrants from Mexico, thus retaining the theme of Mexican immigration but not including symbolic or realistic threat (Appendix I).

Following the article was a questionnaire assessing the article’s style and grammar, followed by questions asking participants how important they thought the news in the article was to Americans like them and how much it would affect Americans like them over the next 3–7 years. The intent of these questions was to partially mask the

manipulation intent of the articles and to focus participants on the issues in the articles and their relevance to the participant's ingroup. Next the packet contained the IEG measurement of moral inclusion/exclusion (Appendix C), a "feeling thermometer" measurement of general affective prejudice toward each group, and the LMES (Appendix D). The packet concluded with measures of perceived symbolic (Appendix A) and realistic (Appendix B) threat (Stephan et al., 1999) using Mexican immigrants as the outgroup; these measures were included as a manipulation check.⁶ All measures showed moderate to high internal consistency as demonstrated by Cronbach's α levels. The IEG scale had an $\alpha = .93$. The LMES showed an overall $\alpha = .90$. The perceived symbolic and realistic threat scales had α levels of .75 and .85, respectively. Pearson correlation coefficients for variables in Study 2 are shown in Table 7. After all participants completed their packets, participants were thanked for their participation, debriefed and dismissed.

Results

Preliminary analyses

A preliminary analysis of the data revealed one participant whose responses constituted an influential data point. This participant's responses on all measures of prejudice, moral exclusion, and perceived symbolic threat were at or above the third standard deviation from the mean. This participant's responses were removed from further analysis. No other participants met this criterion of extreme scores.

As in Study 1, to aid interpretation of results, the feeling thermometer scores were reversed from the measured scale, such that higher scores indicate greater prejudice against the target group. Similarly, the IEG scale scores were reversed so that

Table 7

Pearson Correlation Coefficients (and Degrees of Freedom) Among Study Variables for Study 2

Measures	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Prejudice, all groups	—										
2. Prejudice, Mexican only	.68*** (79)	—									
3. Perceived symbolic threat	.45*** (79)	.52*** (79)	—								
4. Perceived realistic threat	.34** (79)	.41*** (79)	.54*** (79)	—							
5. IEG	.61*** (76)	.64*** (76)	.53*** (76)	.48*** (76)	—						
6. IEG, Mexican only	.50*** (75)	.77*** (75)	.64*** (75)	.54*** (75)	.77*** (75)	—					
7. LMES	.50*** (79)	.62*** (79)	.74*** (79)	.68*** (79)	.66*** (76)	.72*** (75)	—				
LMES subscales:											
8. Social centrality	-.44*** (79)	-.56*** (79)	-.64*** (79)	-.58*** (79)	-.54*** (76)	-.67*** (75)	-.84*** (79)	—			
9. Social capital	-.47*** (79)	-.50*** (79)	-.54*** (79)	-.34** (79)	-.51*** (76)	-.62*** (75)	-.69*** (79)	.54*** (79)	—		
10. Allocation of resources	-.38*** (79)	-.57*** (79)	-.66*** (79)	-.63*** (79)	-.55*** (76)	-.66*** (75)	-.89*** (79)	.73*** (79)	.58*** (79)	—	
11. Self-sacrifice	-.39*** (79)	-.53*** (79)	-.54*** (79)	-.62*** (79)	-.58*** (76)	-.51*** (75)	-.81*** (79)	.61*** (79)	.67*** (79)	.67*** (79)	—
12. Consideration of fairness	-.31** (79)	-.24* (79)	-.49*** (79)	-.44*** (79)	-.41*** (76)	-.40*** (75)	-.64*** (79)	.43*** (79)	.38*** (79)	.38*** (79)	.47*** (79)

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

higher scores indicate greater moral exclusion, in line with the LMES and the concept of moral exclusion in this study.

Manipulation check

It was expected that induced perceptions of symbolic and realistic threats would be causally related to moral exclusion. In order to check that the symbolic and realistic threat manipulations induced perceptions of threat, a 3-way factorial ANOVA using symbolic threat, realistic threat, and sex as factors indicated there were no significant interactions with sex, so a 2-way ANOVA was done collapsing across sex. The 2-way ANOVA table is shown in Table 8.

As expected, the symbolic threat manipulation had a significant main effect on perceived symbolic threat, $F(1, 77) = 5.35, p = .02$, partial $\eta^2 = .07$, but not on perceived realistic threat, $F(1,77) = 0.80, p = .38$. Participants in the symbolic threat present condition showed greater perceived symbolic threat ($M = 4.45, SD = .84$) than the symbolic threat absent condition ($M = 4.01, SD = .85$). Unexpectedly, the realistic threat manipulation did not have a significant main effect on perceived realistic threat. As expected, the realistic threat manipulation did not have an effect on perceived symbolic threat ($F_s = 0.33, ps > .56$). There were no significant interaction effects of the symbolic and realistic threat manipulation on either perceived symbolic threat or realistic threat ($F_s < 1.06, ps > .30$). Means and standard deviations for all conditions are shown in Table 9.

Analysis of Variance

Analysis of variance was used to examine any effects of symbolic threat, realistic threat, sex, and their interactions on the three dependent variables of interest: IEG, IEG for Mexicans only, and the LMES. Although participant sex was not expected to influence the results, analysis of its effects were done to explore any effects it might have.

Table 8

Analysis of Variance for Manipulation Checks in Study 2

Variable and source	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
<i>Perceived symbolic threat</i>					
Symbolic threat	1	3.84	5.35	.023	.065
Realistic threat	1	0.23	0.33	.570	.004
Symbolic × Realistic	1	0.76	1.05	.308	.014
Error	77	0.72			
<i>Perceived realistic threat</i>					
Symbolic threat	1	0.89	0.80	.376	.010
Realistic threat	1	0.36	0.33	.569	.004
Symbolic × Realistic	1	0.86	0.77	.384	.010
Error	77	1.11			

Table 9

Means (and Standard Deviations) for Manipulation Checks in Study 2

Symbolic threat	Realistic threat		
	Absent	Present	Total
<i>Perceived symbolic threat</i>			
Absent	3.97 (1.00)	4.06 (0.69)	4.01 (0.85)
Present	4.60 (0.84)	4.30 (0.82)	4.45 (0.84)
Total	4.29 (0.97)	4.18 (0.76)	
<i>Perceived realistic threat</i>			
Absent	3.84 (1.08)	4.18 (1.27)	4.01 (1.17)
Present	4.25 (0.88)	4.18 (0.96)	4.21 (0.91)
Total	4.04 (0.99)	4.18 (1.11)	

The 3-way ANOVA for all variables showed no significant main or interaction effects for sex, so analyses collapsing across sex were done. A 2-way ANOVA was computed for each of the three dependent variables, using manipulations of symbolic and realistic threat as factors.

Inclusion/Exclusion of Other Groups. It was expected that inducing perception of symbolic and realistic threat should cause greater moral exclusion scores on the IEG and LMES scales. As expected, moral exclusion as measured by the IEG, which includes all six immigrant outgroups, was significantly greater in the symbolic threat present condition ($M = -1.11$, $SD = 0.68$) than the symbolic threat absent condition ($M = -1.46$, $SD = 0.74$), $F(1,74) = 4.52$, $p = .04$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$. Unexpectedly, the main effect for realistic threat was nonsignificant. There was no a priori expectation for any interaction effect, and the interaction effect was non-significant ($F_s < 1.60$, $p_s > .21$). Unexpectedly, the IEG scores for Mexican immigrants only showed that neither main effect was significant. The interaction effect was also nonsignificant ($F_s < 1.87$, $p_s > .17$). The ANOVA table for both IEG and IEG (Mexican only) is shown in Table 10. Means and standard deviations for the IEG scores are shown in Table 11.

Leighton Moral Exclusion Scale. Contrary to expectations, moral exclusion as measured by the LMES showed no significant main effects for symbolic or realistic threat. There was no significant interaction effect ($F_s < 1.25$, $p_s > .267$). The ANOVA table for the LMES is shown in Table 12, and the means and standard deviations are shown in Table 13. A post-hoc ANOVA of the five LMES subscales (social centrality, social capital, allocation of resources, self-sacrifice, and consideration of fairness) showed no significant main effects, nor interaction effects, for any of the subscales.

Table 10

Analysis of Variance for IEG scale in Study 2

Variable and source	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
<i>IEG (all outgroups)</i>					
Symbolic threat	1	2.28	4.52	.037	.058
Realistic threat	1	0.04	0.08	.781	.001
Symbolic × Realistic	1	0.80	1.59	.211	.021
Error	74	0.51			
<i>IEG (Mexican only)</i>					
Symbolic threat	1	2.62	1.86	.177	.025
Realistic threat	1	0.22	0.16	.694	.002
Symbolic × Realistic	1	0.81	0.58	.451	.008
Error	73	1.41			

Table 11

Means (and Standard Deviations) for IEG Scale in Study 2

Symbolic threat	Realistic threat		
	Absent	Present	Total
<i>IEG (all outgroups)</i>			
Absent	-1.54 (0.79)	-1.38 (0.71)	-1.46 (0.74)
Present	-0.99 (0.69)	-1.24 (0.66)	-1.11 (0.68)
Total	-1.26 (0.78)	-1.31 (0.68)	
<i>IEG (Mexican only)</i>			
Absent	-1.05 (1.29)	-0.74 (1.17)	-0.89 (1.23)
Present	-0.48 (0.90)	-0.57 (1.36)	-0.52 (1.12)
Total	-0.76 (1.14)	-0.66 (1.25)	

Table 12

Analysis of Variance for the LMES in Study 2

Source	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Symbolic threat	1	1.15	1.24	.268	.016
Realistic threat	1	0.01	0.01	.940	.000
Symbolic \times Realistic	1	0.79	0.86	.357	.011
Error	77	0.92			

Table 13

Means (and Standard Deviations) for LMES Measure in Study 2

Symbolic threat	Realistic threat		
	Absent	Present	Total
Absent	3.27 (1.07)	3.48 (1.12)	3.38 (1.09)
Present	3.71 (0.90)	3.52 (0.72)	3.61 (0.81)
Total	3.49 (1.00)	3.50 (0.92)	

Mediation analysis

It was found in the ANOVA that symbolic threat has a causal relationship to IEG scores. ITT proposes that prejudice is caused by intergroup threat, so it is possible that the significant effect of symbolic threat on moral exclusion was mediated by prejudice. To test for this possibility, a mediation analysis was done (e.g., Baron & Kenny, 1986).⁷ For this analysis, the mean of prejudice scores for all outgroups was used as the prejudice measure.

The results of the mediation analysis are shown in Figure 2. The direct effect of symbolic threat on IEG was significant ($\beta = .242, p = .03$). Symbolic threat was not a significant predictor of prejudice ($\beta = .014, p = .901$), so the requirements for mediation set by Baron and Kenny (1986) were not met. Thus, there was no evidence that prejudice mediated the effect of symbolic threat on moral exclusion.

Discussion

In Study 2, it was found that participants who were induced to perceive greater symbolic threat showed greater moral exclusion as measured by the IEG. This finding supports the present study's hypothesis that symbolic threat is a cause of moral exclusion, and is in line with ITT and with prior research showing more negative intergroup attitudes when individuals perceive the outgroup to represent a symbolic threat. This is the first empirical demonstration that symbolic threat causes greater moral exclusion. Results of the ANOVA showed that participants in the symbolic threat condition scored higher on moral exclusion as measured by the overall IEG scale than those in the symbolic threat absent condition. As expected, symbolic threat is a causal agent in increased moral exclusion. The fact that the global IEG score (across multiple outgroups) is affected by the symbolic threat manipulation indicates symbolic threat's causal power in a




Figure 2. Standardized Regression Coefficients for Mediation Analysis.

* $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$

contraction of the scope of justice. Unexpectedly, there were no significant differences for any of the moral exclusion measures in the realistic threat condition, but this result is consistent with the failure of the realistic threat manipulation as evidenced by the manipulation check.

It was also found that although symbolic threat affected participant scores on the IEG using all outgroups, this effect did not occur for either the IEG using Mexican immigrants only or the LMES. It is unclear why the symbolic threat manipulation (which used Mexican immigrants as the outgroup) affected IEG scores for the overall measure but not IEG scores for Mexican immigrants only. One possible explanation is that because participants had read newspaper articles about Mexican immigrants, they might have been sensitized to an attempt to alter their attitudes toward Mexican immigrants. They may have then responded by resisting this attempt. This explanation draws on theories of reactance (Brehm, 1966) and self-presentation (Schlenker, 1980; Tetlock & Manstead, 1985).

According to reactance theory, individuals are motivated to maintain freedom to behave and think as they wish, and when this freedom is threatened, they attempt to reassert their freedom (Brehm, 1966). By reasserting their freedom, they project a positive impression of themselves to real or imagined others (Schlenker, 1980). One such way that individuals might engage in positive impression management through reasserting their freedom is by resisting attitude change in the face of a persuasive message. When participants in the study were presented with the newspaper articles that described threats from Mexican immigrants, they may have experienced the articles as a persuasive message that posed a threat to their autonomy, and reacted to the attempted persuasion by taking an attitude opposite of the article. Thus, they may have displayed an "inclusion bias" on the IEG scale in the symbolic threat condition for Mexican immi-

grants but when reporting moral exclusion toward the other outgroups, for which there was no threat to their autonomy through the threat article, they had no such inclusion bias. Although the explanation of reactance and impression management is plausible, strong reactance usually requires that the threatened freedom be of high importance to the individual, which seems unlikely in the case of a newspaper article being a threat to the decisional autonomy of undergraduate participants.

A perhaps more parsimonious and more likely explanation is that the participants experienced measurement reactivity (Campbell, 1957; Campbell & Stanley, 1963), whereby the presence of the Mexican immigration threat article made participants self-conscious and aware of the experimental context. This self-awareness may have led participants to want to seem more inclusionary toward Mexican immigrants in an attempt to engage in impression management toward the experimenter or some imagined other. Since participants were reading about Mexican immigrants, they may not have experienced reactivity to the measurement of exclusion of non-Mexican immigrants. The debriefing protocol did not probe for any suspicion or other evidence of reactivity effects, so this explanation cannot be tested.

Since ITT predicts that symbolic threat causes prejudice, it is possible that the causal effect of symbolic threat on moral exclusion was mediated by prejudice toward the outgroups. However, the results of the mediation analysis gave no evidence that prejudice mediates the relationship between symbolic threat and moral exclusion. The lack of a significant relationship between the symbolic threat condition and prejudice indicates that participants in the symbolic threat present condition showed no greater prejudice than the symbolic threat absent condition. This contradicts ITT's prediction that symbolic threat causes prejudice. However, this may be due to the use of an outgroup (Mexican immigrants) for which participants had prior attitudes. The partici-

pants may have already formed prejudicial attitudes toward Mexican immigrants that may be resistant to being altered by the manipulation.

Unexpectedly, the ANOVA showed that realistic threats did not affect moral exclusion. This is likely due to a failure of the realistic threat induction. The experiment used newspaper articles that described threats posed by Mexican immigrants in order to experimentally induce symbolic and/or realistic threat. The manipulation check indicated that although the newspaper articles induced greater perceived symbolic threat, the newspaper articles failed to elicit the expected increase in perceived realistic threat.

The failure of the realistic threat manipulation and the success of the symbolic threat manipulation might be because participants thought the realistic threat was unimportant and it did not affect them, but thought the symbolic threat was important and did affect them. The study asked participants how important the news was to them or Americans like them, and how much they thought the issues in the articles would affect them and Americans like them over the next 3, 5, and 7 years. Post-hoc analyses of these questions revealed no significant main effects for the symbolic or realistic threat conditions for how important they thought the news was, or how much it would affect them in the next 5 or 7 years. For the question asking how much it would affect them over the next 3 years, there was no significant main effect for the symbolic threat condition, but there was a significant main effect for the realistic threat condition. Participants thought the news would affect them more in the realistic threat present condition ($M = 5.78, SD = 1.31$) than the realistic threat absent condition ($M = 5.28, SD = 1.13$). If the success of the threat manipulations was due to how much participants thought the news was important to them or would affect them, then it would be expected that the symbolic threat manipulation would have failed because there were no significant differences in these variables when the symbolic threat was absent or present. In addition,

the main effect of the realistic threat condition on how much they would be affected in the next 3 years would suggest that the realistic threat manipulation should have been successful, but it was not. Overall, these results do not support the explanation that participants thought the symbolic threat was important or would affect them, but realistic threat was unimportant and did not affect them.

Another explanation for the failure of the realistic threat manipulation is that participants may be keenly attuned to the potential realistic threat posed by Mexican immigrants as a result of current media coverage and political rhetoric surrounding Mexican immigration. If the participants came to the experiment with prior exposure to realistic threats through media, the increase in threat perception attainable in the experimental manipulation might have been very low. In contrast, participants may come to the experiment with less awareness of potential symbolic threats posed by Mexican immigrants, which are less prominent in media and political rhetoric. Consequently, exposure to the idea of symbolic threats posed by Mexican immigrants within the experiment may have a greater effect on perceived symbolic threat than exposure to the realistic threat manipulation would on perceived realistic threat; this difference may lead to detectable changes in perceived symbolic threat but not perceived realistic threat.

Content analyses of media stories on Mexican immigration provides support for the relatively greater media coverage of realistic threats over symbolic threats. In an analysis of immigration coverage in four major U.S. newspapers from June, 2008 to June, 2009, the topics of crime and economics were the two most common topics in newspaper stories, and these topics appeared in over 80% of the stories studied (Chavez, Whiteford, & Hoewe, 2010).⁸ A content analysis of immigration-related letters to the editor appearing in a major Arizona newspaper during the 2005 calendar year

showed that economic threat was referred to twice as often as cultural threat (Costelloe, 2008). Another analysis of U.S. statements by politicians appearing in English language newspapers worldwide between 1993 and 1999 on the topic of Mexican immigration found that economic issues were twice as likely to be the topic of the article than cultural issues, and these references were overwhelmingly negative toward the effects of Mexican immigration (Magaña & Short, 2002).

Another possible reason for the failure of the realistic threat manipulation is suggested in a meta-analytic review of research on intergroup threat and outgroup attitudes. The relationship between perceived realistic threat and outgroup attitudes is generally weaker for studies that manipulate realistic threat than those that measure existing perceptions of realistic threat. In contrast, there is no such difference for studies manipulating versus measuring symbolic threat (Riek et al., 2006). In other words, unlike symbolic threat, it is generally more difficult to induce realistic threat perception leading to attitude change than it is to measure existing attitudes and realistic threat perception.

General Discussion

The present research demonstrated that perceived symbolic and realistic threats posed by an outgroup predict moral exclusion independently of prejudice toward the outgroup (Study 1), and that symbolic threat posed by an outgroup is a causal agent in moral exclusion (Study 2), an effect not mediated by prejudice. Theoretical approaches to moral exclusion and the scope of justice have proposed that intergroup threat may be an important factor in moral exclusion (e.g., Deutsch, 2006). Intergroup threats have been shown in previous studies to predict exclusionary intergroup attitudes and prejudice (e.g., McLaren, 2003; Quillian, 1995), and many of these studies have shown cultural and economic threats (which are analogous to symbolic and realistic threat) to predict

attitudes consistent with moral exclusion (e.g., Canetti et al., 2009; Corneille et al., 2001; Halperin et al., 2007; Passini, 2008; Watts, 1996). But many of the studies have conflated cultural and economic threat. The present studies provide direct evidence that symbolic and realistic threat make unique contributions in predicting moral exclusion, even when accounting for prejudice. Further, symbolic threat was shown to have a causal role in moral exclusion.

Intergroup Threat Theory

The present research used ITT as a rubric for understanding the relationship between symbolic and realistic threats and moral exclusion. ITT proposes that both perceived symbolic and realistic threats should be related to moral exclusion, but that symbolic threats should be especially likely to lead to moral exclusion (Stephan et al., 2009). The results of Study 1 are contrary to ITT. Although both perceived symbolic and realistic threat are unique predictors of moral exclusion, perceived realistic threat is a slightly, and non-significantly, stronger predictor of moral exclusion than symbolic threat. Other data support this finding that perceived symbolic and realistic threat have similar strength in predicting moral exclusion. For example, a study using a 1997 Eurobarometer survey of 17 European Union countries found that both symbolic and realistic threat were relatively strong predictors of desire for expulsion of immigrants, and had nearly identical predictive power (McLaren, 2003). These results along with the present research bring into question the postulate of ITT that perceived symbolic threat is especially likely to lead to moral exclusion.

Even though perceived symbolic threat was not shown to predict moral exclusion more strongly than realistic threat, two results from the present studies provide evidence of its importance in moral exclusion. First, symbolic threat was shown to be a causal factor in moral exclusion as measured by the IEG in Study 2. Second, in Study 1,

perceived symbolic threat was shown to uniquely predict moral exclusion, even after accounting for prejudice, an effect was robust across both the IEG and LMES measures of moral exclusion. Other research has shown that perceived symbolic threat more consistently predicted exclusionary attitudes than perceived realistic threat (Ariely, 2011). Clearly perceived symbolic threat is an important factor in moral exclusion, but symbolic threat must be considered along with realistic threat when exploring the causes of moral exclusion.

Study 2's results provided support for the hypothesis that symbolic threat is a causal factor in moral exclusion. The failure to demonstrate a causal link between realistic threat and moral exclusion was unexpected. Because of prevailing political rhetoric and media coverage of immigration issues that focuses on the threat Mexican immigrants have to the economy, realistic threat may be so strongly associated with Mexican immigrants in the minds of the participants that it is a stronger and relatively automatic reaction in absence of any eliciting stimulus. Thus it is more difficult to affect perceived realistic threat in the minds of participants. But, when presented with a newspaper article about the symbolic threat represented by Mexican immigration (in the two conditions explicitly discussing this threat), participants who might not previously have recognized symbolic threat then begin to consider the symbolic threat posed by Mexican immigrants. This novel consideration may cause the effect of symbolic threat to emerge. In other words, Study 2's fictitious newspaper articles may have provided an opportunity for symbolic threats to be perceived more strongly by participants, and the effect to emerge, whereas their realistic threat perception might have been relatively impervious to manipulation.

In addition, both Study 1 and Study 2 gave evidence for the importance of prejudice as a predictor of moral exclusion. Prejudice toward the outgroups in Study 1 was

shown to be strongly associated with moral exclusion, but after accounting for prejudice, perceived symbolic and realistic threats were shown to uniquely predict moral exclusion scores. ITT proposes that perceived realistic and symbolic threats cause prejudice (Stephan et al., 2009), so it is possible that prejudice might mediate the relationship between symbolic threat and moral exclusion. However, in Study 2, symbolic threat was not shown to predict prejudice, so there is no evidence of prejudice mediating the relationship between symbolic threat and moral exclusion. These results indicate that while prejudice is a potent factor in moral exclusion, the influences of realistic and symbolic threat are each important contributors to moral exclusion, over and above the influence of prejudice.

It was also shown in Study 2 that the overall IEG score for all immigrant outgroups was affected by the symbolic threat manipulation. The symbolic threat manipulation used Mexican immigrants as the target group, so it might be expected that the IEG (Mexican only) would be affected, whereas the overall IEG would not. Similarly, the LMES, which used Mexican immigrants as the target outgroup, should have been affected by the manipulation but it was not. However, this result indicates that perception of threat from one outgroup (Mexican immigrants) may affect the moral exclusion of other outgroups (immigrants from other countries). This finding may reflect a contraction of the scope of justice in the face of perceived threat as the moral community shrinks toward the ingroup. This is an important finding in scope of justice research that has not previously been explored and may point to the importance of underlying psychological processes such as social categorization and intergroup differentiation.

Psychological Processes in Moral Exclusion

The scope of justice is a psychological boundary that delineates between those inside and outside our moral community (Deutsch, 1974, 1985; Opatow, 1988, 1990a,

1990b), and thus categorizes those whom are included and excluded. This boundary might expand and contract in response to situational factors such as intergroup threat (Deutsch, 2006). The contraction of the boundary may mean that outgroups other than the outgroup that directly poses the perceived threat may also be subject to moral exclusion, as the scope of justice contracts across the entire moral universe. For example, threat posed to America by Islamic terrorists who are also immigrants might cause an American's scope of justice to contract so that all immigrant outgroups are subject to greater moral exclusion. In fact, shortly after the September 11th, 2001 Al-Qaida attacks on the United States, public opinion in the United States and Canada advocated greater restriction of immigration than before the attacks, and web sites advocating immigration restriction linked immigration policy to the terrorist attacks, describing the symbolic and realistic threats represented by immigrants (Esses, Dovidio, & Hodson, 2002).

This contraction of the scope of justice as a product of threat may reflect an underlying social categorization process (Oakes, 1996) whereby the context of intergroup threat increases the perception of intergroup differences, making ingroup social identity more salient and leading to depersonalization and the emergence of group-based attitudes and behavior. For the example above, in the absence of terrorist threat, immigrants may be perceived at a more interpersonal level, but as threat increases, social categorization depersonalizes the individual, leading to group identity and perception of group-based threat. The scope of justice boundary may then be drawn closer to the ingroup, resulting in outgroups other than terrorist groups, such as immigrant outgroups, becoming more excluded from the scope of justice. This social categorization—moral exclusion process is a “policing of intergroup boundaries” (Stephan et al., 2009, p. 52), which is proposed to arise as a response to intergroup threat. Further studies might

help understand whether and how the effect of symbolic and realistic threats from one outgroup generalize to other outgroups through the contraction of the scope of justice, and how the contraction of the scope of justice in response to intergroup threat is underpinned by social categorization processes.

Measurement of Moral Exclusion

Despite more than two decades of research on moral exclusion and the scope of justice, few measures of the construct exist. Recently, Passini and Morselli (2011) developed and validated a moral inclusion/exclusion scale—the Inclusion/Exclusion of Other Groups (IEG) scale. The scale has been validated in U.S. and Italian populations (Leighton et al., 2012) but has thus far been used only in correlational studies. The present research used this scale to measure moral exclusion in an experimental manipulation paradigm for the first time. IEG was shown to be predicted by perceived symbolic and realistic threats, in accord with ITT, and the IEG scores were affected in the expected way by experimentally induced symbolic threat. This provides further validation of this instrument as a measure of moral exclusion.

The development of a new measure of moral exclusion for the present study was important to provide for the inclusion of two new constructs as part of moral exclusion—social centrality and social capital—while incorporating classic aspects of moral exclusion delineated by Opatow: allocation of resources to the outgroup, self-sacrifice for the welfare of the outgroup, and consideration of fairness for the outgroup (Opatow, 1990b). While Opatow's classic factors in moral exclusion are important, the concepts of social centrality and social capital capture important aspects of intergroup dynamics in social systems: political and economic power and interdependence. These aspects are important for the full inclusion of marginalized outgroups in the moral community and are crucial for outgroups to effect social change leading to a more inclusive, sustainable

society (cf. Diani, 1997; Gittell, Ortega-Bustamante, & Steffy, 2000; Subasic, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008; Szeleter, 2002).

It was unexpected that the LMES was less sensitive to the effect of prejudice relative to the IEG. On cursory inspection, it appears that the IEG may tap more affective responses through statements such as “members of this group deserve no respect” and “members of this group are extremely uncivilized.” In contrast, the LMES may tap more cognitive aspects of intergroup attitudes through statements such as “it’s okay that members of this group think they are being taken advantage of” and “safety and security of this group is a good use of our public resources.” Thus, the IEG’s more affectively loaded statements may tap the more affective aspects of prejudice, whereas the LMES does not. An avenue of research could study the degree to which each measure is related to group-based emotions (Miller et al., 2004) and how these emotions differentially affect responses on each measure.

The LMES was shown to be predicted by prejudice, symbolic threat, and realistic threat similarly to the IEG, but it was also less sensitive to effects from general prejudice relative to intergroup threats. Thus it may be a useful instrument for delineating moral exclusion in the context of intergroup threat by reducing the effect that general prejudice might play. A full analysis of reliability and validity is outside the scope of the present research, but additional studies using this instrument will be conducted to further establish its psychometric properties.

Future Steps for Research

The present studies are helpful in explicating the relationships between moral exclusion and symbolic and realistic threat. There are numerous paths to take with this research, and I will focus here on just a few.

First, the present studies failed to elicit realistic threat, so the predictions of the ITT have not been fully tested. The use of Mexican immigrants as the target group, an immigrant outgroup well established in the minds of participants, might have restricted the variability obtained with the realistic threat manipulation, because participants might have come to the experiment with already-formed associations between Mexican immigrants and perceived realistic threat. To make it more likely that the symbolic and realistic threat manipulations would elicit the desired threat perceptions, it may be necessary to use a novel outgroup with which participants have no experience, a method that has been used successfully in previous studies on intergroup threat and attitudes toward immigrants (e.g., Esses et al., 1998; Stephan et al., 2005). For example, a future study could use a novel immigrant group, described as being resettled into the local area in large numbers as part of a refugee relocation program, as the target group. In this case, participants' perceptions of this outgroup might be more malleable and more responsive to the threat manipulations than they were in Study 2, which used an outgroup that was likely to elicit preexisting realistic threat associations.

Second, this research is limited to self-report of moral exclusion. No research to date has used the moral exclusion scales (IEG or LMES) to predict behavioral outcomes. Extending moral exclusion research to behavioral intentions or actual behaviors is important to ensure that the measures we are using are ecologically valid. Behavioral intentions are good predictors of behavioral outcomes across a broad array of behavioral domains (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005), so measurement of moral exclusion toward an outgroups and behavioral intentions to help that outgroup attain greater access to resources and other social goods would be a good beginning to understanding the potential predictive power of moral exclusion on behaviors toward the outgroups. This research has already been done using non-human analogues (Opatow, 1995), but exten-

sions to human outgroups would be valuable. For example, an experiment might measure moral exclusion toward an outgroup such as homosexuals or drug addicts and present participants with an opportunity to donate money or time to a group working to help the outgroup. The resulting relationship between moral exclusion and behavioral intentions would give preliminary evidence of moral exclusion as a predictor of behaviors.

Third, research is still lacking in understanding the basic psychological processes underlying the effects of intergroup threat on moral exclusion. Is it, for example, necessary that the threat is perceived to be posed by an outgroup? Perhaps moral exclusion of an outgroup could be increased even in the context of more generalized threats. Experiments could test the effects of interpersonal threat versus intergroup threat. It may be the case that any generalized systemic arousal increases moral exclusion; might systemic arousal mediate the effect of intergroup threats?

Experiments to discover whether the effects of threat on moral exclusion are mediated by social categorization and delegitimization (cf. Bar-Tal, 1989; Wenzel, 2009) could help better understand how moral exclusion emerges in the context of intergroup threat. Another basic process that may be useful to understand is what role emotions, particularly disgust, contempt, and fear, have in dehumanization and moral exclusion in response to intergroup threats (cf. Harris & Fiske, 2006). It may be that the negative affect aroused by intergroup threat mediates threat's effects on moral exclusion. If it is the case that generalized systemic arousal leads to greater moral exclusion, inducing extreme positive affect may also result in moral exclusion.

Practical implications

Moral exclusion is a serious problem in societies because it has the potential to lead to structural and direct violence, usually by a dominant majority against a margin-

alized minority. In the current studies, moral exclusion of immigrants, particularly Mexican immigrants, was the focus. This topic has immediate practical relevance because of vigorous immigration policy debate that has been ongoing in the United States and Europe for at least the last two decades.

In 2010 Arizona's legislature enacted laws that required police officers to demand proof of citizenship from those who they suspected of being in the country without authorization. Since then, legislatures in five more U.S. states have passed laws restricting the participation in civil society of undocumented nationals, and these laws have especially affected Mexican immigrants. These laws allow the state to deprive individuals of utility service and access to higher education, to invalidate business contracts, and to prohibit them from business transactions with government agencies; these laws also permit authorities to stop, search, and detain individuals whom authorities have a "reasonable suspicion" of being in the U.S. without authorization (Gomez, 2011; Preston, 2011a; Savage & Williams, 2011).

In an interesting creation of a sub-group of morally excluded individuals, South Carolina's legislature exempted maids, fishermen, and farm laborers from being subject to verification of immigration status by employers (Phillips, 2012). Consequently, employers are relieved of the worry that they are hiring unauthorized immigrants to work in potentially exploitative, strenuous, low-wage jobs. The immigrants then exist at the margins of the society, without access to political or economic power, without the security of citizenship, and always prone to deportation if they are otherwise detected. These laws are a form of structural violence against these undocumented immigrants and are at the core of moral exclusion: denial of considerations of fairness, access to resources, refusal to make sacrifices for their welfare, and lack of social centrality and social capital.

The present research shows that perceived cultural and economic threats are factors in the moral exclusion of an immigrant outgroup. These perceived threats are potent antecedents to the moral exclusion of immigrants, and a behavioral outcome may be seen in the immigration laws that are currently being enacted by states. Statements of legislators in states where harsh anti-immigration laws have been passed or proposed provides evidence of perceived threat around the issue of immigration. The sponsor of Arizona's immigration legislation recently testified in a U.S. Senate committee hearing that "the invasion of illegal aliens we face today...pose[s] one of the greatest threats to our nation in terms of political, economic and national security" (Litvan, 2012). State legislators from Pennsylvania and South Carolina cited the dire effects undocumented immigrants had on state budgets, referring to the "illegal alien invasion," as a "malady of epic proportions" (Preston, 2011b). An Alabama state senator, referring to the way Southerners take extreme measures in the face of threat, advised fellow legislators to "empty the clip and do what has to be done" to pass strict immigration laws (Rolley, 2011).

This research contributes to an understanding of the psychological processes that legislators might be using when forming these kinds of exclusionary laws and that citizens use when considering supporting them. When legislators and citizens see threats posed by an outgroup to their values, morals, resources, and well-being, it sets the stage for moral exclusion of the outgroup, moving them outside the scope of justice. Once moved outside the scope of justice, structural violence through marginalization, delegitimization, and even direct violence can be justified and enacted. Understanding the formation of the scope of justice and the dynamics of its contraction and expansion is imperative for building sustainable, peaceful, inclusive societies and institutions.

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Footnotes

¹ A full description of the “racialization” of Rwanda is beyond the scope of this dissertation. For example, it is interesting to note that it did not originate with the Rwandans themselves; the national ID cards which specified the ethnic constitution of each individual were originated by Rwanda’s Belgian colonizers as an administrative aid. See Eltringham (2004) for a complete description

² One study used economic threat along with percent of immigrants from non-Western countries as predictors of prejudice (Quillian, 1995). It is unclear what this percentage represents in terms of threat. That is, does the percentage represent a symbolic threat through dilution of the ingroup’s cultural values, or an economic threat through the greater competition for jobs and other resources?

³ Following the predictor variables, the packet contained questionnaires which assessed group identification as “Americans” and “world citizens” (adapted from Leach et al., 2008), Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), and Right Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996). Because these variables are not of interest in the present study and their measurement followed the predictor variables, their data will not be analyzed or discussed.

⁴ Although there was no a priori hypothesis about any interactive effects of symbolic and realistic threats on moral exclusion, the interaction term was entered in Step 3 to explore the possibility of such effects.

⁵ Some wording for the articles was based on content found on the following immigration-related web sites: <http://www.fairus.org>, <http://www.azcentral.com>, <http://www.mdcathcon.org>

⁶ Following the primary dependent variables, the packet contained questionnaires that assessed group identification as “Americans” and “world citizens” (adapted from Leach et al., 2008), Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto et al., 1994), and Right Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996). Since these variables are not of interest in the present studies and their measurement followed the dependent variables of interest, their data will not be analyzed or discussed.

⁷ Because the ANOVA for IEG indicted no main effect of realistic threat or an interaction effect, a test of the mediation of realistic threat’s effects on IEG by prejudice was not done. Similarly, the ANOVA for IEG (Mexican only) and LMES showed no significant main or interaction effects, so mediation analyses were not performed for these variables.

⁸ The four newspapers were the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and USA Today.

Appendix A

The Symbolic Threat scale.

For each of the following statements, please indicate how much you agree with the statement. Please provide a rating from 1 to 7, using the following scale:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Moderately Agree	Strongly Agree

- ___ 1. Mexican immigrants should learn to conform to the rules and norms of American society as soon as possible after they arrive.
- ___ 2. Immigration from Mexico is undermining American culture.
- ___ 3. The values and beliefs of Mexican immigrants regarding work are basically quite similar to those of most Americans.
- ___ 4. The values and beliefs of Mexican immigrants regarding moral and religious issues are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans.
- ___ 5. The values and beliefs of Mexican immigrants regarding family issues and socializing children are basically quite similar to those of most Americans.
- ___ 6. The values and beliefs of Mexican immigrants regarding social relations are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans.
- ___ 7. Mexican immigrants should not have to accept American ways.

Appendix B

The Realistic Threat scale.

For each of the following statements, please indicate how much you agree with the statement. Please provide a rating from 1 to 7, using the following scale:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Moderately Agree	Strongly Agree

- ___ 1. Mexican immigrants get more from this country than they contribute.
- ___ 2. The children of Mexican immigrants should have the same right to attend public schools in the United States as Americans do.
- ___ 3. Mexican immigration has increased the tax burden on Americans.
- ___ 4. Mexican immigrants are not displacing American workers from their jobs.
- ___ 5. Mexican immigrants should be eligible for the same health-care benefits received by Americans.
- ___ 6. Social services have become less available to Americans because of Mexican immigration.
- ___ 7. The quality of social services available to Americans has remained the same, despite Mexican immigration.
- ___ 8. Mexican immigrants are as entitled to subsidized housing or subsidized utilities (water, sewage, electricity) as poor Americans are.

Appendix C

The Inclusion/Exclusion of other Groups (IEG) scale.

For each group, please indicate which of the two statements best describes your opinion?

Put an X on the number, considering that +3 on the left means you completely agree with the statement on the left, and +3 on the right means you completely agree with the statement on the right.

(Put only one X for each row/group)

For instance, if you quite agree with the statement on the left, put the X in this way:

Statement on the left							Statement on the right
Group 1	+3	X	+1	0	+1	+2	+3

Instead, if you completely agree with the statement on the right, put the X in this way:

Group 2	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	X
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Values held by this group represent a threat to our well-being

Values held by this group represent an opportunity for our well-being

French immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3
Mexican immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3
Canadian immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3
Korean immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3
Italian immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3
Chinese immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3

Members of this group deserve no respect

Members of this group deserve our utmost respect

French immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3
Mexican immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3
Canadian immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3
Korean immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3
Italian immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3
Chinese immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3

It is necessary to avoid any kind of contact with members of this group

It is necessary for all of us to engage in establishing constructive contacts with this group's members

French immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3
Mexican immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3
Canadian immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3
Korean immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3
Italian immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3
Chinese immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3

Instructions reminder:

For instance, if you quite agree with the statement on the left, put the X in this way:

	Statement on the left				Statement on the right		
Group 1	+3	X	+1	0	+1	+2	+3

Instead, if you completely agree with the statement on the right, put the X in this way:

Group 2	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	X
----------------	----	----	----	---	----	----	--------------

I think that members of this group of people are extremely uncivilized.

French immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3
Mexican immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3
Canadian immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3
Korean immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3
Italian immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3
Chinese immigrants	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	+2	+3

I think that members of this group of people are extremely civilized

Appendix D

Leighton Moral Exclusion Scale (LMES).

A new scale developed to measure moral exclusion, including social capital and social centrality as elements of the scope of justice, using a 7-point Likert-type response format, anchored with “disagree strongly” and “agree strongly.” Reversed items marked with asterisk. Parenthetical headings not included in scale as administered. Items included in this scale:

(Social centrality)

“Mexican immigrants should not be elected to city, county, and state public offices.” *

“I think Mexican immigrants should have access to bank loans to start businesses.”

“I would be opposed to having more Mexican immigrants as business leaders, such as Chief Executive Officers.” *

“We should fund programs to help Mexican immigrants purchase homes in residential areas where they are underrepresented”

“I would be opposed to Mexican immigrants having a community festival on the Fayetteville town square.” *

(Social Capital)

“We should do more to inform Mexican immigrants about American culture, and also inform Americans about Mexican immigrant culture.”

“We don’t need to make sure Mexican immigrants know about job openings in business and public agencies.” *

“We should help Mexican immigrants join political parties and form political groups.”

“I would trust a police officer who is a Mexican immigrant.”

“I would trust a professor who is a Mexican immigrant.”

(Allocating resources)

“Our community should use resources for leisure facilities in areas with large Mexican immigrant populations”

“Our community resources shouldn’t be used for the health of Mexican immigrants.” *

“Safety and security of Mexican immigrants is a good use of our public resources.”

“Education for Mexican immigrants is a good use of our public money.”

“Allocating public resources to expand work and business opportunities for Mexican immigrants is not a good idea.” *

(Sacrifice for well-being)

“We should help Mexican immigrants who don’t have enough food, even if it means we have to give up something we need.”

“I think we need to make sacrifices if it means Mexican immigrants would feel safe and secure.”

“It is completely unacceptable to forego our own needs to foster the well-being of Mexican immigrants.” *

(Considerations of fairness)

“It is okay if Mexican immigrants think they are being taken advantage of.” *

“Mexican immigrants should never be forced to give into our demands.”

“We need to ensure we don’t exploit Mexican immigrants.”

“Mexican immigrants should have no choice but do what we want them to do.” *

Appendix E.

Demographic Information Questionnaire.

Demographic questionnaire:

Age: _____

Sex: Female Male

Year in college:

 Freshman/1st year Sophomore/2nd Junior/3rd Senior/4th 5th +Are you an immigrant from Mexico or a child of an immigrant from Mexico: yes noAre you an immigrant from France or a child of an immigrant from France: yes noAre you an immigrant from Italy or a child of an immigrant from Italy: yes noAre you an immigrant from China or a child of an immigrant from China: yes noAre you an immigrant from Korea or a child of an immigrant from Korea: yes noAre you an immigrant from Canada or a child of an immigrant from Canada: yes no

Race (Check all that apply):

 American Indian or Alaska Native Asian Black or African American Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander White

Ethnicity:

 Hispanic or Latino Not Hispanic or Latino

Appendix F

Stimulus Material Wording:
Realistic Threat Present, Symbolic Threat Absent Condition.

Experts on immigration today released a report detailing how federal, state, and local finances and labor markets are being threatened by Mexican immigration. The National Commission on Immigration, formed by a congressional mandate in 2011, is made up of non-partisan experts from industry, academia, and government.

Walter Kemp, the commission's chairman, is a nationally-recognized expert who has studied immigration while on the faculty of Harvard University, and is now an advisor to the Congress and President Obama. The impact on America's economy and the well-being of its citizens because of Mexican immigrants, both documented and "illegal," is "unprecedented in its scope," he wrote in the report's introduction, "and the threat this represents is important for all Americans to understand to help protect the American economy."

The report notes that Mexican immigration is a drain on the national economy, as estimated at \$67–87 billion per year. At the local level, Mexican immigration costs the taxpayers over \$24 billion a year in education costs, and the influx of immigrants into schools also creates a burden for teachers, negatively impacting the education of non-immigrant students.

At the state level, state universities are also feeling the weight of Mexican immigration. In the report, experts estimate that even current students are impacted, as enrollment of Mexican immigrants into universities has gone up. Students are seeing fewer available classes, larger class sizes, and increasing tuition costs. At the same time, scholarships are becoming smaller and harder to get as Mexican immigrants are awarded scholarships over native students. The report points out that these effects are all directly tied to the rapidly increasing influx of Mexican immigration, and will increase in severity over the coming years.

Appendix G

Stimulus Material Wording:
Symbolic Threat Present, Realistic Threat Absent Condition.

Experts on immigration today released a report detailing how cultural values, traditions, and beliefs that have been characteristic of Americans for the last 200 years are changing as a consequence of Mexican immigration. The National Commission on Immigration, formed by a congressional mandate in 2011, is made up of non-partisan experts from industry, academia, and government.

Walter Kemp, the commission's chairman, is a nationally-recognized expert who has studied immigration while on the faculty of Harvard University, and is now an advisor to the Congress and President Obama. The impact on American culture, values, and traditions because of Mexican immigrants, both documented and "illegal," are "unprecedented in their scope," he wrote in the report's introduction, "and the threat this represents is important for all Americans to understand to help preserve American cultural values and traditions."

Immigrants from Mexico are threatening American culture by replacing the English language and American symbols of identity, and Spanish is now replacing English everywhere from colleges to churches. The report points out that for the first time in U.S. history, half of those entering the United States speak a single non-English language.

"Education is changing fundamentally, from K-12 to universities," Kemp writes, as schools are increasingly becoming bilingual and bicultural. As their numbers increase, Mexican immigrants become more committed to their own ethnic identity and culture, and are forcing changes to the culture of academia and disrupting its traditions and values. For example, many universities are adopting new rules that require athletic events to celebrate the contributions of Mexican immigrant student athletes. Other honored traditions such as marching bands or patriotic celebrations are often eliminated to accommodate these new events. The report points out that these effects are all directly tied to the rapidly increasing influx of Mexican immigration, and will increase in severity over the coming years.

Appendix H

Stimulus Material Wording:
Symbolic Threat Present, Realistic Threat Present Condition.

Experts on immigration today released a report detailing how American culture and economy is threatened by Mexican immigration. The National Commission on Immigration, formed by a congressional mandate in 2011, is made up of non-partisan experts from industry, academia, and government.

Walter Kemp, the commission's chairman, is a nationally-recognized expert who has studied immigration while on the faculty of Harvard University, and is now an advisor to the Congress and President Obama. The impact on America's economy and culture because of Mexican immigrants, both documented and "illegal," is "unprecedented in its scope," he wrote in the report's introduction, "and the threat this represents is important for all Americans to understand to help protect American culture and the American economy."

Immigrants from Mexico are threatening American culture by replacing the English language and American symbols of identity. "Education is changing fundamentally, from K-12 to universities," Kemp writes. As their numbers increase, Mexican immigrants are forcing changes to the culture of academia and disrupting its traditions and values. For example, many universities are adopting new rules that require athletic events to celebrate the contributions of Mexican immigrant student athletes. Other honored traditions such as marching bands or patriotic celebrations are often eliminated to accommodate these new events.

The report notes that Mexican immigration is a drain on the national economy, as estimated at \$67–87 billion per year. At the local level, the influx of immigrants into schools also creates a burden for teachers, negatively impacting the education of non-immigrant students. The report notes that as enrollment of Mexican immigrants into universities has gone up, current students are seeing fewer available classes, larger class sizes, and increasing tuition costs, while scholarships are smaller and harder to get as Mexican immigrants are awarded scholarships over native students.

The report points out that these effects on American culture and economic well-being are directly tied to the rapidly increasing influx of Mexican immigration, and will increase in severity over the coming years.

*Appendix I***Stimulus Material Wording:
Symbolic Threat Absent, Realistic Threat Absent Condition.**

Experts on immigration today released a report detailing the significant financial and personal costs immigrants from Mexico face, whether they immigrate through official channels or through crossing the border without authorization. The National Commission on Immigration, formed by a congressional mandate in 2011, is made up of non-partisan experts from industry, academia, and government.

Walter Kemp, who chairs the commission, is a nationally-recognized expert who has studied immigration while on the faculty of Harvard University, and is now an advisor with congress and President Obama. The problems faced by immigrants, both documented and “illegal,” are “unprecedented in their scope,” he wrote in the report’s introduction, “and are important for all Americans to understand.”

Legal immigration requires an immigrant visa, which is usually obtained through sponsorship of family members or employers, but can be obtained because the immigrant is fleeing persecution, or through a lottery. In terms of Mexican immigrants, visas sponsored by a family member or employer often takes 8-10 years to obtain because of low availability and high demand. Persecution is very hard to prove, and Mexicans are excluded from the lottery. Thus, some Mexican immigrants choose to risk crossing the border without authorization.

The financial and personal costs of crossing without authorization are steep. Illegal border crossings are controlled by a cartel of “coyotes,” who smuggle the immigrant across the border through routes they have established. The coyotes charge \$3,000 to \$5,000 per person who crosses, an amount that represents several years of income in rural Mexico.

